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Articles
The North American Free Trade
Agreement and the Environment: The
Lessons of Metalclad Corporation v. United
Mexican States
Lucien J. Dhooge"
[The Metalclad decision] most certainly was a decisive legal victory. Equally
important is the guidance it gives to host states and investors.
1
[The Metalclad decision] reinforces our long-held fears that NAFTA's rules for
international investors open up the back door to attacks on environmental
laws and regulations. Corporations should not be allowed to sue governments
when environmental protection decisions do not go in their favor.
2
I. INTRODUCTION
On October 31, 1990, the Mexican Secretariat of Urban and
Ecological Development (SEDUE) authorized Salvador Aldrett,
a Mexican national, to build and operate a transfer station for
the temporary storage of hazardous waste at La Pedrera, a
valley located in the Municipality of Guadalcazar, State of San
Luis Potosi, Mexico.3 On January 23, 1993, the National
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, University of the Pacific; Member, Colorado
and District of Columbia Bars; LL.M., 1995, International and Comparative Law,
Georgetown University Law Center; J.D., 1983, University of Denver College of
Law; B.A., 1980, University of Colorado. The author wishes to thank his family and
friends for their constant encouragement and inspiration.
1. Rossella Brevetti & John Nagel, Arbitration Panel Awards U.S. Firm
Metalclad $16.7 Million in NAFTA Dispute with Mexico, 17 IN'L TRADE REP. 1374
(Sept. 7, 2000) (quoting Clyde C. Pearce, lead attorney for Metalclad Corporation,
Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, Int'l Centre for the Settlement of Inv.
Disputes, No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (2000)).
2. Id. (quoting Brent Blackwelder, President, Friends of the Earth).
3. See Award, Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, Int'l Centre for the
Settlement of Inv. Disputes, No. ARB(AF)/97/1, 28, at 9 (2000) [hereinafter
Award]; see also METALCLAD CORP., MEMORIAL IN SUPPORT OF CLAIMS BEFORE THE
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Ecological Institute (INE), an independent sub-agency of the
Secretariat of the Mexican Environment, National Resources
and Fishing (SEMARNAP), granted Aldrett's successor-in-
interest, Confinamiento Thcnico de Residuos Industriales, S.A.,
a Mexican corporation (COTERIN), a federal permit to construct
a hazardous waste landfill at La Pedrera (Landfill).4 COTERIN
also received a permit from INE and SEDUE's successor agency,
the Secretariat of Social Development, authorizing construction
of the Landfill on February 3, 1993.5 Finally, on May 11, 1993,
the State of San Luis Potosi granted COTERIN a state land use
permit to construct the Landfill.6 Based upon assurances of
support received by the President of INE, the General Director
of SEDUE, the Governor and Congress of San Luis Potosi,
professors at the Autonomous University of San Luis Potosi
(AUSLP) and other government officials, and believing that all
necessary government permits had been obtained or were in
progress, on April 23, 1993, Metalclad Corporation (Metalclad),
a U.S. corporation organized pursuant to the laws of the State of
Delaware, entered into a six-month option agreement to
purchase COTERIN. 7 On August 10, 1993, INE granted
COTERIN a federal permit for the operation of the Landfill.8
Shortly thereafter, on September 10, 1993, Metalclad exercised
its option and purchased COTERIN, the Landfill and all
associated permits.9
However, Metalclad encountered immediate difficulties in
constructing and operating the Landfill. Shortly after
completion of its purchase of COTERIN, the Governor of San
INT'L CENTRE FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES 1 & 16, at 51 (1997)
[hereinafter MEMORIAL]. Mexican governmental agencies will be referred to
throughout this article by their translated English designations.
4. See Award, supra note 3, 29, at 9.
5. See MEMORIAL, supra note 3, at 2 & 22, at 54.
6. See id. at 2 & 23, at 54-55; see also Award, supra note 3, 31, at 9.
7. See Award, supra note 3, 30, at 9; see also MEMORIAL, supra note 3, at 2,
23-24, at 55-56 & 49, at 67.
8. See Award, supra note 3, 35, at 10; see also MEMORIAL, supra note 3, at 3
& 24, at 55.
9. See Award, supra note 3, 35, at 10; see also MEMORIAL, supra note 3, at 3.
Metalclad acquired COTERIN, the Landfill and the associated permits through two
subsidiaries. Eco-Metalclad Corporation (Eco-Metalclad), a corporation organized
pursuant to the laws of Utah and wholly-owned by Metalclad, owned Ecosistemas
Nacionales, S.A. (ECONSA), a Mexican corporation, which in turn acquired
COTERIN and its assets. See Award, supra note 3, 2, at 2-3; see also MEMORIAL,
supra note 3, 2, at 40. For purposes of this article, the designation "Metalclad" will
be collectively utilized to refer to the Delaware corporate entity as well as Eco-
Metalclad and ECONSA unless otherwise noted.
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Luis Potosi, Horacio Sanchez Unzueta, and the State Director of
the Environment, Pedro Medellin Milan, embarked upon a
public campaign to denounce and prevent construction and
operation of the Landfill. 10 This opposition continued unabated
despite an agreement reached in April 1994 between Metalclad
and officials of San Luis Potosi pledging support for the Landfill
and permitting the commencement of construction at the site."
Construction continued until October 26, 1994, when officials of
Guadalcazar ordered cessation of all building activities due to
the absence of a municipal construction permit. 12 Construction
resumed on November 15, 1994 after Metalclad was directed to
resume its activities on the site by a representative of the
Federal Attorney's Office for the Protection of the Environment
(PROFEPA) on the basis that federal authority was preeminent
in this area. 13
Nevertheless, Metalclad applied for a construction permit
from Guadalcazar on November 15, 1994.14 Guadalcazar
subsequently rejected Metalclad's application on December 5,
1995. This denial occurred despite the granting of additional
construction permits by INE on January 31, 1995, the issuance
of positive environmental audits by AUSLP and PROFEPA in
February and March 1995, the completion of Metalclad's
construction activities in March 1995 and the execution on
November 25, 1995 of an agreement between Metalclad, INE
and PROFEPA providing for the operation of the Landfill. 15
Metalclad was never notified of the Guadalcazar Town Council
meeting at which its permit application was discussed and
denied nor did the Council take notice of any of the activities
occurring at the site during the thirteen-month pendency of the
permit application. 16
Guadalcazar also initiated administrative and judicial
10. See Award, supra note 3, 37, at 10; see also MEMORIAL, supra note 3, at 4
& 9-10, at 44-49, 1$ 28-29, at 58-59 & IT 48-147, at 66-107.
11. See Award, supra note 3, 91 38, at 10; see also MEMORIAL, supra note 3, at 5
& 1$ 66-68, at 73-74.
12. See Award, supra note 3, 40, at 10; see also MEMORIAL, supra note 3, at 7,
19(4), at 45 & 9 80-81, at 78-79.
13. See Award, supra note 3, 41, at 10; see also MEMORIAL, supra note 3, at 7
& 1, at 79.
14. See Award, supra note 3, 1 42, at 10; see also MEMORIAL, supra note 3, at 7
& 1 83, at 80.
15. See Award, supra note 3, 11 43-45 & 47-50, at 11-12; see also MEMORIAL,
supra note 3, at 8-15, 1 14, at 50-51, IT 34-40, at 60-64 & 191 84-86, at 80-81.
16. See Award, supra note 3, 11 51 & 54, at 12; see also MEMORIAL, supra note
3, at 15.
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proceedings against Metalclad in an attempt to prevent the
opening of the Landfill. 17 Metalclad further alleged that
Guadalcazar and San Luis Potosi officials retained
demonstrators who blocked access to the Landfill, thereby
preventing initiation of operations.'8 Subsequent attempts to
resolve the controversy through negotiation failed, and, on
September 23, 1997, three days before the expiration of his
term, Unzueta issued a decree creating an ecological preserve
that included within its boundaries the entirety of the Landfill. 19
As a result, Metalclad's operations at La Pedrera ceased, and
the Landfill never opened for business. 20
In the era of the pre-global economy, Metalclad would have
suffered economic losses arising from the actions of Guadalcazar
and San Luis Potosi without the opportunity for recompense.
However, on October 2, 1996, Metalclad notified Mexico of its
intent to initiate arbitration pursuant to Subchapter B of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to recover
losses suffered by it as a result of the actions of officials of
Guadalcazar and San Luis Potosi with respect to the Landfill. 21
Metalclad claimed that it had been "whipsawed" between the
federal, state and local governments 22 and that the operation of
the Landfill had become increasingly political at the expense of
science and fundamental property rights. 23 The company alleged
that the actions of Guadalcazar and San Luis Potosi constituted
a violation by Mexico of its obligations with respect to the
protection of international investments pursuant to NAFTA.24
Metalclad initiated arbitration proceedings against Mexico
before the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) on January 2, 1997.25 Over three
and one-half years later, on August 30, 2000, the ICSID tribunal
17. See Award, supra note 3, 55-56, at 12-13; see also MEMORIAL, supra note
3, at 17, 26, 9(2), at 44-45, 42-44, at 65 & 140, at 104-5.
18. See Award, supra note 3, 46, at 11; see also MEMORIAL, supra note 3, at 9,
16, 9(5), at 45-46, 29, at 58-59 & 89-90, at 82-83.
19. See Award, supra note 3, 1 58-59, at 13; see also MEMORIAL, supra note 3,
at 16-27, 9(6), at 46 & 102-47, at 88-107.
20. See Award, supra note 3, 1 62, at 13; see also MEMORIAL, supra note 3, at
27 & 146, at 106-7.
21. See Award, supra note 3, 91 7, at 5; see also MEMORIAL, supra note 3, at 35.
22. MEMORIAL, supra note 3, 91 11, at 49.
23. See MEMORIAL, supra note 3, at 15, 20-21, 23, 9 97-98, at 86-87 & 9 148-
50, at 108-9.
24. See generally North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 1993, 107
Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289, 1993 WL 574441 [hereinafter NAFTAI.
25. See Award, supra note 3, 91 8, at 5; see also MEMORIAL, supra note 3, at 35.
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issued an opinion in which it determined that Mexico failed to
accord Metalclad's investment fair and equitable treatment in
violation of Article 110526 and expropriated such investment in
violation of Article 1110.27 The tribunal's decision marked the
first time that one of the three NAFTA member states had lost a
case brought against it pursuant to the investor-state provisions
of Chapter Eleven. 28
The Metalclad Arbitration provoked a firestorm of criticism.
Environmentalists decried the claims as an assault upon
domestic environmental laws 29 and an abuse of Chapter
Eleven's investor-state provisions in a manner not intended by
the contracting parties. 30  Critics further charged that
Metalclad's claims were demonstrative of a trend in the
utilization of Chapter Eleven favoring the protection of the
profits of multinational corporations over legitimate exercises of
sovereignty by local governments.31 The procedures by which
Metalclad's claims were resolved were condemned as
undemocratic primarily due to their secrecy and the lack of
input from Guadalcazar and San Luis Potosi.32 Furthermore,
critics claimed that utilization of NAFTA in this fashion would
deny the public its previously uninhibited right to clean water
and air and serve to chill the adoption of environmental
measures by national and local governments in the future.33 As
a result, several environmental groups, including the Council of
Canadians, Greenpeace and the Sierra Club of Canada, have
called upon NAFTA's Free Trade Commission to suspend
proceedings challenging environmental protections until such
time as the contracting parties clarify the relation of
26. See Award, supra note 3, $ 74-101, at 17-20.
27. See id. $ 102-12, at 20-22.
28. See James F. Smith, Mexico Appeals Decision on Metalclad, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 1, 2000, at C2.
29. See Danielle Knight, Mexico Ordered to Pay U.S. Company $17 Million,
INTER PRESS SERV., available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/environmentl
nafta/html (Aug. 31, 2000).
30. See Brevetti & Nagel, supra note 1, at 1375; see also Abid Aslam,
Corporations Use Trade Pact to Sue Countries, INTER PRESS SERV., available at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/tncs/aslam.html (Sept. 2, 1998); Knight, supra
note 29.
31. See Knight, supra note 29; see also Danielle Knight, Profit-Hungry
Transnationals Will Accelerate Eco-Disasters, FREE PRESS J., available at
http://www.indiaworld.co.in/news/features/feature378.html (June 6, 2000).
32. See Brevetti & Nagel, supra note 1, at 1375; see also Knight, supra note 31.
33. See Aslam, supra note 30; see also Knight, supra note 29; Jonathon
Peterson, A World of Difference in Trade Views, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1999, at Al.
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environmental laws to NAFTA's investor-state provisions. 34
These groups charged that claims, such as those asserted by
Metalclad, would grow in number and severity without
immediate action to amend or reinterpret NAFTA's investor-
state provisions. 35 These concerns were echoed by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency and NAFTA's Commission for
Environmental Cooperation.36
This article examines the tribunal's decision in the
Metalclad Arbitration and its impact upon environmental
regulation. Initially, the article examines the factual
background underlying the Metalclad Arbitration. Particular
emphasis is placed upon the governmental process to which
Metalclad was subjected, its impact upon Metalclad's ability to
operate the Landfill and the tribunal's decision. Part III of the
article analyzes the meaning of the tribunal's decision, its
potential impact upon future Chapter Eleven claims and its
implications for national and local environmental regulation.
The article concludes that, although the tribunal reached the
proper result in granting Metalclad relief upon its claims, the
consequences for future national and local environmental
regulation arising from such claims are nothing short of
disastrous. These consequences should provide further impetus
to the contracting parties to amend or clarify NAFTA's Chapter
Eleven investor-state provisions.
II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO METALCLAD
34. See Environmentalists Press for Broad Review of NAFTA Handling of
Cases, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Sierra Club of Canada, Ottawa, Ont., Can.), July 1, 1999,
at 1 available at http://www.seirraclub.ca/national trade-env/wto-brief-ju199.html;
see also Sierra Club of Canada, Put Growing Number of NAFTA Lawsuits on Hold,
Say Groups Concerned with Environment available at http://www.canadians.org/
campaigns/ campaigns-trademedia990422.html (last modified Apr. 22, 1999); Letter
from the Sierra Club of Canada to the North American Commission for
Environmental Cooperation 2 (June 28, 1999) (on file with author); Letter from the
Sierra Club of Canada to the North American Free Trade Commission 2 (June 24,
1999) (on file with author).
35. See Latest NAFTA Lawsuit Proves Threat of Chapter 11 to Health and
Environmental Laws, Again (Council of Canadians, Ottawa, Ont., Can.), June 16,
1999, at 1.
36. See Environmentalists Press for Broad Review of NAFTA Handling of
Cases, supra note 34. Former U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Administrator
Carol Browner questioned the validity of claims challenging environmental laws
pursuant to Chapter Eleven of NAFTA, and the North American Commission for
Environmental Cooperation expressed "deep concern over the use of Chapter 11
cases to undermine environmental legislation." Id.
214 [Vol. 10:2
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CORPORATION V. UNITED MEXICAN STATES
A. THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
Although a comprehensive history of NAFTA is beyond the
scope of this article, a brief review of its applicable provisions is
necessary in order to place the Metalclad Arbitration in its
proper context. Effective on January 1, 1994, NAFTA serves
several different purposes. 37 NAFTA's Preamble identifies
fourteen separate purposes to be accomplished by the creation of
a free trade area between the United States, Canada and
Mexico.38 These purposes are further elaborated in six objectives
identified in Article 102. Article 102 specifically provides that
the objectives of NAFTA are to: (1) eliminate tariff and non-
tariff barriers to trade; (2) promote fair competition; (3) increase
investment opportunities; (4) provide protection for intellectual
property rights; (5) create procedures for effective
implementation and enforcement of the Agreement; and (6)
establish a forum for further enhancement and expansion of the
benefits provided by the Agreement. 39 Article 102(2) provides
that the specific provisions of the Agreement are to be
37. NAFTA was implemented in the United States through the adoption of the
NAFTA Implementation Act of 1993. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3473 (1994).
38. See NAFTA, supra note 24, at pmbl. NAFTA's purposes as identified in the
Preamble are to:
Strengthen the special bonds of friendship and cooperation among [the]
nations; contribute to the harmonious development and expansion of world
trade and provide a catalyst to broader international cooperation; create an
expanded and secure market for the goods and services produced in [the
member states'] territories; reduce distortions to trade; establish clear and
mutually advantageous rules governing [the member states'] trade; ensure
a predictable commercial framework for business planning and investment;
build on [the member states'] respective rights and obligations under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and other multilateral and
bilateral instruments of cooperation; enhance the competitiveness of [the
member states'] firms in the global marketplace; foster creativity and
innovation, and promote trade in goods and services that are the subject of
intellectual property rights; create new employment opportunities and
improve working conditions and living standards in [the member states']
respective territories; undertake each of the preceding in a manner
consistent with environmental protection and conservation; preserve [the
member states'] flexibility to safeguard the public welfare; promote
sustainable development; strengthen the development and enforcement of
environmental laws and regulations; and protect, enhance and enforce
basic workers' rights.
Id. (capitalization omitted).
39. See id. art. 102(1)(a-f).
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interpreted and applied "in light of these objectives" and "in
accordance with applicable rules of international law."40 These
purposes and objectives and their implementation within the
specific provisions of the Agreement are binding upon the
federal governments of the respective parties as well as their
subnational components. 41
The rules governing the treatment and protection of foreign
investments made by the parties or their nationals within each
other's respective territories are set forth in Chapter Eleven of
the Agreement. Chapter Eleven has three primary objectives.
These objectives are:
(1) to establish a secure investment environment through the
elaboration of clear rules of fair treatment of foreign investment and
investors; (2) to remove barriers to investment by eliminating or
liberalizing existing restrictions; and (3) to provide an effective means
for the resolution of disputes between an investor and the host
government.
42
These purposes are accomplished through the provision of
five basic protections for NAFTA investors and their
investments. These basic protections are: (1) nondiscriminatory
treatment; (2) freedom from performance requirements; (3) the
right to freely transfer funds related to an investment; (4)
expropriation only in conformity with international law; and (5)
the right to international arbitration to seek redress for
purported violations of the Agreement's protections. 43 These
40. Id. art. 102(2).
41. See id. art. 201(2).
42. Daniel M. Price & P. Bryan Christy III, An Overview of the NAFTA
Investment Chapter, in THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: A NEW
FRONTIER IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN THE AMERICAS 172 (Judith
H. Bello et al. eds., 1994).
43. See U.S. GEN. ACOT. OFFICE, REP. No. GAO/GGD-93-137B, NORTH
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT - ASSESSMENT OF MAJOR ISSUES, vol. 2, at 18
(1993) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. From the standpoint of the United States, these
five basic protections incorporate the protections granted to foreign investment by
the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement and the prototypical bilateral
investment treaty utilized by the United States. See id. at 19. The bilateral
investment treaty utilized by the United States provides for:
(1) nondiscriminatory treatment; (2) elimination of performance
requirements; (3) unrestricted "transfers," including capital and profit
repatriation; (4) expropriation protection based on international legal
standards, including compensation equivalent to the "fair market value" of
the investment; and (5) binding third-party arbitration to resolve disputes.
Id. at 19 n.11.
The United States insisted upon the inclusion of these basic protections
primarily to liberalize Mexico's investment regime, which was perceived as
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protections are broader than any bilateral or multilateral
instrument to which the United States is a party and establish a
standard for future hemispheric and global investment
treaties."
Chapter Eleven applies to "measures adopted or maintained
by a Party relating to: (a) investors of another Party; (b)
investments of investors of another Party in the territory of the
Party; and (c) with respect to Articles 1106 (performance
requirements) and 1114 (environmental measures), all
investments in the territory of the Party."45  The term
"investment" embraces virtually all forms of participation in a
business enterprise including majority and minority ownership
interests, income and profit-sharing agreements, tangible and
intangible property (including goodwill and intellectual property
rights) and real estate.46 Government procurement and financial
constraining and containing few protections for private investors from state
interference. See HOWARD MANN & KONRAD VON MOLTKE, NAFTA's CHAPTER 11
AND THE ENVIRONMENT: ADDRESSING THE IMPACTS OF THE INVESTOR-STATE PROCESS
ON THE ENVIRONMENT 12 (1999).
44. See Price & Christy, supra note 42, at 182; see also MANN & VON MOLTKE,
supra note 43, at 5 (noting that Chapter Eleven contains "the most extensive
combination of rights and remedies ever provided to foreign investors in an
international agreement"). Id.
45. NAFTA, supra note 24, art. 1101(1). An "investor of a Party" is defined as
'a Party or state enterprise thereof, or a national or an enterprise of such Party, that
seeks to make, is making or has made an investment." Id. art. 1139. An "investment
of an investor of a Party" is defined as "an investment owned or controlled directly or
indirectly by an investor of such Party." Id.
46. Article 1139 defines the term "investment" to mean:
(a) an enterprise; (b) an equity security of an enterprise; (c) a debt security
of an enterprise i) where the enterprise is an affiliate of the investor, or (ii)
where the original maturity of the debt security is at least three years, but
does not include a debt security, regardless of original maturity, of a state
enterprise; (d) a loan to an enterprise i) where the enterprise is an affiliate
of the investor, or (ii) where the original maturity of the loan is at least
three years, but does not include a loan, regardless of original maturity, to
a state enterprise; (e) an interest in an enterprise that entitles the owner to
share in income or profits of the enterprise; (f) an interest in an enterprise
that entitles the owner to share in the assets of that enterprise on
dissolution, other than a debt security or a loan excluded from
subparagraph (c) or (d); (g) real estate or other property, tangible or
intangible, acquired in the expectation or used for the purposes of economic
benefit or other business purposes; and (h) interests arising from the
commitment of capital or other resources in the territory of a Party to
economic activity in such territory, such as under (i) contracts involving the
presence of an investor's property in the territory of a Party, including
turnkey or construction contracts, or concessions, or Cii) contracts where
renumeration depends substantially on the production, revenues or profits
of an enterprise; but investment does not mean, (i) claims to money that
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services are excluded from NAFTA's investment provisions.47
The investment provisions are also subject to general exceptions
for national security, taxation, balance of payments and
Canadian "cultural industries. "4
Chapter Eleven is divided into two subchapters. Subchapter
A of the Agreement, encompassing Articles 1101 through 1114,
sets forth the substantive rights of investors and the duties of
the parties with respect to investment. There are six basic
protections afforded to investors and investments pursuant to
Subchapter A. Article 1102 requires that each party accord to
investors of another party and investments of investors of
another party "treatment no less favorable than that it accords,
in like circumstances, to its own investors [and investments of
its own investors] with respect to the establishment, acquisition,
expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other
disposition of investments."49  This national treatment
requirement extends to sub-national states and provinces of the
parties.50 Article 1103 requires that each party accord to
investors of another party and investments of investors of
another party "treatment no less favorable than it accords, in
like circumstances, to investors [and investments of investors] of
any other Party or of a non-Party with respect to the
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct,
operation, and sale or other disposition of investments."51
Investors of another party and their investments are entitled to
the most favorable of the treatments required by Articles 1102
and 1103.52 In any event, Article 1105 requires that each party
treat investments of investors of another party "in accordance
with international law, including fair and equitable treatment
arise solely from (i) commercial contracts for the sale of goods or services by
a national or enterprise in the territory of a Party to an enterprise in the
territory of another Party, or (ii) the extension of credit in connection with
a commercial transaction, such as trade financing, other than a loan
covered by subparagraph (d); or (j) any other claims to money, that do not
involve the kinds of interests set out in subparagraphs (a) through (h).
NAFTA, supra note 24, art. 1139.
47. See GAO REPORT, supra note 43, at 20.
48. See id. at 20-21. The cultural industries exception does not apply to
obligations between the United States and Mexico. See id. at 21.
49. NAFTA, supra note 24, arts. 1102(1) & (2). Government subsidies payable
exclusively to domestic enterprises are excluded from the national treatment
provisions of Article 1102. See GAO REPORT, supra note 43, at 21.
50. See NAFTA, supra note 24, art. 1102(3).
51. Id. arts. 1103(1) & (2).
52. See id. art. 1104.
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and full protection and security."53 Article 1106 eliminates
performance requirements for foreign investors and their
investments operating in the territory of a party,54 and Article
1109 eliminates restrictions upon the transfer of investment-
related funds into and out of a party.55
Chapter Eleven also protects investors in the event of
expropriation or nationalization of property. Article 1110(1)
prohibits the parties from "directly or indirectly nationaliz[ing]
or expropriat[ing] an investment of an investor of another Party
53. Id. art. 1105(1).
54. See id. art. 1106. Article 1106(1) lists seven performance requirements that
may not be imposed with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion,
management, conduct or operation of an investment of an investor of a party or of a
non-party in its territory. See id. art. 1106(1). The prohibited requirements include:
(1) exportation of a given level or percentage of goods or services; (2) achievement of
a specified level of domestic content; (3) purchase from or giving preference to a local
supplier; (4) restrictions upon imports to a certain volume or value of exports or to
an amount of foreign exchange inflows; (5) restrictions upon domestic sales to a
certain volume or value of exports or to an amount of foreign exchange earnings; (6)
transfers of technology, production processes or other proprietary knowledge to a
domestic entity; and (7) acting as an exclusive supplier of the goods or services it
produces to a specific region or world market. See id. Furthermore, parties may not
utilize the first four listed performance measures as a condition to receive an
advantage such as a tax concession or other investment incentive. See id. art.
1106(3). However, parties may condition receipt of such advantages on "compliance
with a requirement to locate production, provide a service, train or employ workers,
construct or expand particular facilities, or carry out research and development, in
its territory." Id. art. 1106(4). Parties are also permitted to impose performance
requirements other than those prohibited by Articles 1106(1) and (3). See id. art.
1106(5). Finally, provided that such measures are not applied in an arbitrary or
unjustifiable manner, or do not constitute a disguised restriction on international
trade or investment, parties are free to adopt and maintain measures "necessary to
secure compliance with laws and regulations that are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Agreement... necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health; ... or necessary for the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible
natural resources." Id. art. 1106(6).
55. See id. art. 1109. The prohibition upon transfer restrictions contained
within Article 1109 applies to profits, dividends, interest, capital gains, royalties,
management fees, returns in kind and other amounts derived from investments. See
id. art. 1109(1). Proceeds obtained from the sale or liquidation of all or any part of
an investment, payments under a contract entered into by an investor or investment
and payments arising out of an investment dispute are also subject to the
prohibition upon transfer restrictions. See id. Furthermore, the parties must permit
such transfers to be made in freely convertible foreign currency at the market rate of
exchange prevailing on the date of the transfer. See id. art. 1109(2). However, these
prohibitions are subject to NAFTA's balance of payment exception as well as
restrictions applied in an equitable, non-discriminatory and good faith manner with
respect to bankruptcy, insolvency and other proceedings for the protection of
creditors, securities laws, criminal or penal offenses, reports of transfers of currency
and other monetary instruments or measures designed to ensure satisfaction of
judgments. See id. art. 1109(4).
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in its territory or tak[ing] a measure tantamount to
nationalization or expropriation of such an investment" unless
the party is able to satisfy four separate criteria.56 These criteria
are that the taking must: (1) be for a public purpose; (2) occur on
a non-discriminatory basis; (3) occur in accordance with due
process of law and the requirements of Article 1105(1) of equity,
fairness, full protection and security as provided in
international law; and (4) occur only upon the payment of
compensation. 57 Adequate compensation is defined in Article
1110(2) as the equivalent of "fair market value of the
expropriated investment immediately before the expropriation
took place... [without] reflect[ing] any change in value
occurring because the intended expropriation had become
known earlier."58 Criteria that may be utilized to calculate fair
market value include going concern value, asset value (including
the declared tax value of tangible property) and other
appropriate measures of value.59 Compensation reflecting the
fair market value of the expropriated investment must be paid
without delay upon calculation and must be fully transferable
and realizable. 60 If fair market value is to be paid in a G7
currency, such compensation must also include interest at a
"commercially reasonable rate" from the date of expropriation to
the date of actual payment.61
Article 1110 does not define what constitutes "a measure
56. Id. art. 1110(1).
57. See id.
58. Id. art. 1110(2).
59. See id.
60. See id. arts. 1110(3) & (6). "Fully realizable and transferable compensation"
prohibits a party from compensating an injured investor in local currency and then
preventing that investor from converting the local currency into the currency of
another country before removing it from the territory of the expropriating party. See
GAO REPORT, supra note 43, at 23 n.15.
61. NAFTA, supra note 24, art. 1110(4). Article 1138 defines G7 currency as
"the currency of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United States or the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland." Id. art. 1138. By contrast,
if a party elects to pay compensation in a currency other than that of a G7 country,
the amount payable to the injured investor, if converted into a G7 currency at the
market rate of exchange prevailing on the date of payment, shall be no less than:
if the amount of compensation owed on the date of expropriation had been
converted into that G7 currency at the market rate of exchange prevailing
on that date, and interest had accrued at a commercially reasonable rate
for that G7 currency from the date of expropriation until the date of
payment.
Id. art. 1110(5).
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tantamount to nationalization or expropriation."62 Article
1110(8) does provide that a non-discriminatory measure of
general application "shall not be considered a measure
tantamount to an expropriation of a debt security or
loan.., solely on the ground that the measure imposes costs on
the debtor that cause it to default on the debt."63 Article 1110(7)
exempts the creation, licensing, limitation and revocation of
intellectual property rights from the operation of Article 1110(1)
in the event that such actions occur in a manner consist with
Chapter Seventeen of the Agreement relating to intellectual
property.64 What is clear is that Article 1110's expropriation and
compensation provisions enjoyed full support among
representatives of the United States, Canada and Mexico during
NAFTA negotiations.65 Furthermore, there is no exception to
Article 1110 granted to national, state, provincial or local
governments, and all levels of government are bound by Article
1110's commitment.
Subchapter B establishes procedures concerning the
settlement of investor disputes. The purpose of Subchapter B is
to establish "a mechanism for the settlement of investment
disputes that assures both equal treatment among investors of
the Parties in accordance with the principle of international
reciprocity and due process before an impartial tribunal."66 The
investor dispute resolution procedures established by
Subchapter B differ from other dispute resolution provisions
contained within NAFTA by creating a process that may "be
initiated by the investor, without the cooperation or any
involvement of its own government, using existing legal
procedures for the resolution of international commercial
disputes."67 Indeed, the dispute resolution processes set forth in
Subchapter B are the first in any multilateral trade or
62. Id. art. 1110(1); see also Price & Christy, supra note 42, at 175. One
prescient commentator noted at the time of the implementation of NAFTA that
"[t]his is an area which is certain to receive attention from future NAFTA dispute
settlement panels as acts which are not considered to constitute expropriation by the
host state, but which impair the benefits of NAFTA investors, may be subject to this
NAFTA obligation." BARRY APPLETON, A CONCISE USER'S GUIDE TO THE NORTH
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 86 (1994).
63. NAFTA, supra note 24, art. 1110(8).
64. See id. art. 1110(7).
65. See LESLIE A. GLICK, UNDERSTANDING THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT 25 (2d ed. 1994).
66. NAFTA, supra note 24, art. 1115.
67. Tim Kennish, NAFTA and Investment - A Canadian Perspective, in NAFTA
AND INVESTMENT § 4.2, at 31 (Seymour J. Rubin & Dean C. Alexander eds., 1995).
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investment agreement to grant foreign private investors the
capacity to directly challenge host governments with respect to
their compliance with the Agreement. 68 Pursuant to Articles
1116 and 1117, an investor of a party, on its own behalf,69 or on
behalf of an enterprise that the investor owns or controls, 70 may
initiate a claim alleging that the investor or the enterprise has
suffered injury as a result of a breach by the host state of a
provision of NAFTA. 71 Private parties are not required to
exhaust available remedies pursuant to the laws of the host
state prior to initiating a claim pursuant to Chapter Eleven's
investor dispute resolution mechanism. 72
Actions of national, state, provincial and local governments
in contravention of Chapter Eleven may form the basis of a valid
claim asserted by an injured investor pursuant to NAFTA's
investor dispute resolution procedures. 73  The national
governments of the Parties are charged with responsibility for
assuring implementation of NAFTA's provisions and are
accountable in the event that they are unable to secure state or
68. See MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 43, at 4. From the U.S. standpoint,
the primary target of this unprecedented grant of standing to private foreign
investors was Mexico in order that "U.S. companies no longer face an unbalanced
environment in an investment dispute with the Mexican government but can seek
arbitration outside Mexico by an independent body." Id. at 12.
69. See NAFTA, supra note 24, art. 1116(1). Article 1116(1) provides, in part,
that "[aMn investor of a Party may submit to arbitration under this section a claim
that another Party has breached an obligation under... Section A... and that the
investor has incurred loss or damage by reason of, or arising out of, that breach." Id.
70. See id. art. 1117(1). Article 1117(1) provides, in part, that:
[a]n investor of a Party, on behalf of an enterprise of another Party that is
a juridical person that the investor owns or controls directly or indirectly,
may submit to arbitration under this Section a claim that the other Party
has breached an obligation under... Section A... and that the enterprise
has incurred loss or damage by reason of, or arising out of, that breach.
Id.
Commentators have noted the importance of this provision in permitting
investors to maintain actions against host states where the alleged injury is indirect.
See Kennish, supra note 67, § 4.3, at 32 (noting that "[the importance of this
provision is that it permits the investor to assert a claim [on behalf of an entity]...
where the only injury has been sustained by the entity and the investor has himself
not been independently or directly injured.") Id. See also Price & Christy, supra note
42, at 177 (noting that Article 1117 "is intended to... [permit] the investor to assert
a claim for injury to its investment even where the investor itself does not suffer loss
or damage independent from that of the injury to its investment.") Id.
71. An investor making a claim pursuant to Subchapter B is referred to as a
"disputing investor." NAFTA, supra note 24, art. 1139. The state against which a
claim has been made is referred to as a "disputing Party." Id.
72. See Kennish, supra note 67, § 4,2, at 31 & § 4.3, at 32.
73. See Price & Christy, supra note 42, at 178.
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provincial compliance. Article 105 provides that "[t]he Parties
shall ensure that all necessary measures are taken in order to
give effect to the provisions of this Agreement, including their
observance... by state and provincial governments."7 4 Article
105 codifies an established principle of international law that
holds national governments responsible for acts of their
component states, even where existing law does not provide
them with the means of compelling such states to fulfill existing
international obligations.75 In addition, Article 105 codifies the
long-standing recognition by the United States that it is
responsible for the misconduct of its states7 6 as well as its
understanding with respect to the liability of national
governments for violations of NAFTA by their component states
and provinces.77 Article 1105(1) also requires that the parties
provide "full protection and security" to investments of investors
of other Parties.78 This provision codifies another established
principle of international law holding states responsible for
their failure to exercise due care to prevent harm to aliens
caused by third parties within their jurisdiction. 79
Arbitration is the mode of dispute resolution selected by
NAFTA with respect to claims between injured investors and
the national governments of the Parties. Article 1122 provides
74. NAFTA, supra note 24, art. 105.
75. See IAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE
RESPONSIBILITY 141 (1983) (noting that "[it is well settled that a state cannot plead
the principles of municipal law, including its constitution, in answer to an
international claim.").
76. The U.S. State Department has acknowledged that, in its relations with
other states maintaining federal forms of government, "[the United States has]
invariably insisted on the liability of the Federal Government, although the
failure... was chargeable to the officials of one of the constituent states or
provinces." 5 GREEN HAYWOOD HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw§ 527,
at 594 (1943).
77. The U.S. Statement of Administrative Action with respect to NAFTA
provides that "no country can avoid its commitments under the Agreement by
claiming that the measure in question is a matter of state or provincial jurisdiction."
[NAFTA] Statement of Administrative Action 5, in Message From the President of
the United States, H.R. Doc. NO. 103-159, vol. 2, at 5 (1993). In this regard, the U.S.
Trade Representative noted that "Article 105 ... mean[s] that the federal
government will be held accountable if it cannot secure state or provincial
compliance with NAFTA obligations." Letter from Michael Kantor, U.S. Trade
Representative, to Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, Subcommittee on Health and the
Environment 4 (Sept. 7, 1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2858, 2862.
78. NAFTA, supra note 24, art. 1105(1).
79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 183(b)(ii) (1965); see also BROWNLIE, supra note 75, at 161; LOUIS
HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 717 (3d ed. 1993).
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that each Party consents to the submission of claims to
arbitration in accordance with Subchapter B.80 Investors may
submit their arbitration claims under the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention),8' the Additional
Facility Rules of the ICSID Convention 82 or the Arbitration
Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law.83 Despite these options, as the United States is the only
NAFTA member currently a signatory to the ICSID Convention,
arbitration claims against it can only proceed pursuant to the
Additional Facility Rules or the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.84
There are several limitations placed upon claims asserted
by investors against the national governments of the parties.
Claims must be submitted within three years "from the date on
which the investor first acquired, or should have acquired,
knowledge of the alleged breach and knowledge that the
investor has incurred loss or damage."8 5 However, claims cannot
80. See NAFTA, supra note 24, art. 1122(1).
81. See id. art. 1120(1)(a). See generally Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter
ICSID Convention]. A claim for arbitration can only be brought pursuant to the
ICSID Convention if "both the disputing Party and the Party of the investor are
parties to the Convention." NAFTA, supra note 24, art. 1120(1)(a).
82. See NAFTA, supra note 24, art. 1120(1)(b). See generally Rules Governing
the Additional Facility for the Administration of Proceedings by the Secretariat of
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID Doc. 11
(June 1979), available at www.icsid/facility/facility/htm [hereinafter Additional
Facility Rules]. A claim for arbitration pursuant to the Additional Facility Rules
may be brought if "either the disputing Party or the Party of the investor, but not
both, is a party to the ICSID Convention." NAFTA, supra note 24, art. 1120(1)(b).
83. See NAFTA, supra note 24, art. 1120(1)(c). See generally Arbitration Rules
of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Report of the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Official Records of the United
Nations General Assembly, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 17 (A/31117), ch. V § C (1976)
[hereinafter UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules].
84. The ICSID Convention had been signed or ratified by 148 states as of
September 2000. See List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the
Convention, Int'l Centre for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, at 1-5 (2000). The United
States signed the ICSID Convention on August 27, 1965 and deposited its
ratification on June 10, 1966. See id. at 5. The ICSID Convention entered into force
with respect to the United States on October 14, 1966. See id. See also Price &
Christy, supra note 42, at 178.
85. NAFTA, supra note 24, arts. 1116(2) & 1117(2). A claim is deemed
submitted when:
(a) the request for arbitration under paragraph (1) of Article 36 of the
ICSID Convention has been received by the Secretary-General; (b) the
notice of arbitration under Article 2 of Schedule C of the ICSID Additional
Facility Rules has been received by the Secretary-General; or (c) the notice
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be filed within six months of the occurrence of the events giving
rise to the claims.8 6 Article 1121(1) requires the disputing
investor to waive the right to initiate or continue litigation of
the dispute before another administrative tribunal, court or
other dispute settlement body as a condition precedent to
submission of a claim for arbitration pursuant to Article 1116.87
Article 1121(2) establishes the same condition precedent for
claims initiated pursuant to Article 1117.88 Disputes arising
from the financial services industry8 9 or from an action of a
party involving national security interests 90 are outside of the
scope of Subchapter B. Subchapter B also is not applicable to
certain decisions by Canadian and Mexican investment
authorities91 as well as disputes that an investor may have with
private parties in the state in which it invests.92
NAFTA's procedures with respect to investment disputes
initially require the parties to attempt to settle claims through
consultation or negotiation. 93 Failing settlement of the claim, a
disputing investor is required to serve upon the disputing party
written notice of its intention to submit a claim to arbitration at
least ninety days before the actual submission.94 The tribunal
of arbitration given under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules is received by
the disputing Party.
Id. art. 1137(1).
86. See id. art. 1120(1).
87. See id. arts. 1121(1)(a) & (b). As arbitration panels convened pursuant to
Subchapter B are only permitted to award monetary damages and interest, Article
1121 exempts "proceedings for injunctive, declaratory or other extraordinary relief,
not involving the payment of damages, before an administrative tribunal or court"
from the waiver requirement. Id. art. 1121(1)(b); see also art. 1135(1).
88. See id. arts. 1121(2)(a) & (b).
89. Procedures and protections for the financial services industry are set forth
in Chapter 14 of NAFTA. See NAFTA, supra note 24, arts. 1401-16; see also
Kennish, supra note 67, § 4.3, at 33.
90. See NAFTA, supra note 24, art. 1138(1) (providing, in part, that "a decision
by a Party to prohibit or restrict the acquisition of an investment in its territory by
an investor of another Party, or its investment, pursuant to [Article 2102 (National
Security)] shall not be subject to [Subchapter B])." Id.
91. See id. annex 1138.2 With respect to Canada, Annex 1138.2 provides, in
part, that "[a] decision... following a review under the Investment Canada Act,
with respect to whether or not to permit an acquisition that is subject to review,
shall not be subject to the dispute settlement provisions of Section B." Id. The same
exemption is granted to decisions of Mexico's National Commission on Foreign
Investment. See id.
92. See Kennish, supra note 67, § 4.3, at 33.
93. See NAFTA, supra note 24, art. 1118.
94. See id. art. 1119. The notice of intent to submit a claim to arbitration must
disclose: (1) the name and address of the disputing investor; (2) the name and
address of the enterprise (if the claim is to be brought pursuant to Article 1117); (3)
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responsible for conducting the arbitration consists of three
arbitrators with one arbitrator appointed by each of the
disputing parties and a third, who is designated as the presiding
arbitrator, appointed by agreement of the disputing parties.95
Regardless of its composition, the tribunal must decide the
issues in dispute in accordance with NAFTA and applicable
rules of international law.96
The tribunal is authorized to order interim measures to
preserve the rights of the parties or ensure the full effectiveness
of the tribunal's jurisdiction. 97 If a tribunal makes a final award
in favor of a disputing investor, it may only award, separately or
in combination, monetary damages, interest, restitution of
property and costs in accordance with applicable arbitration
rules.98 Tribunals are expressly prohibited from ordering a party
to pay punitive damages. 99
Although lacking the force of precedent, 100 final awards are
binding upon the disputing parties 10 ' and must be fully enforced
the provisions of NAFTA alleged to have been violated by the disputing party; (4)
the issues raised by the claim and factual basis for the claim; (5) the factual basis for
the claim; and (6) the relief sought and amount of damages claimed. See id.
95. See id. art. 1123. If a tribunal is not constituted within ninety days from
the date of submission of the claim, the secretary-general of ICSID may appoint the
arbitrator or arbitrators not yet appointed upon the request of either party. See id.
art. 1124(2). If the disputing parties are unable to agree upon a presiding arbitrator,
the secretary-general of ICSID, on the request of either party, may appoint such
arbitrator from a roster of forty-five designated arbitrators appointed by consensus
by the parties. See id. arts. 1124(3) & (4). The presiding arbitrator so appointed
cannot be a national of the disputing investor or party. See id. art. 1124(3). If no
such person is available to serve as a presiding arbitrator, the secretary-general of
ICSID must make his appointment from the ICSID Panel of Arbitrators. See id. In
any event, the arbitrator selected from the ICSID Panel of Arbitrators may not be a
national of any of the parties. See id.
96. See id. art. 1131(1).
97. See id. art. 1134.
98. See id. art. 1135(1). In the event the tribunal awards a disputing investor
restitution of property, such award must provide that the disputing party may pay
monetary damages and applicable interest in lieu of restitution. See id.
99. See id. art. 1135(3).
100. See id. 1136(1). Article 1136(1) specifically provides that "[ain award made
by a Tribunal shall have no binding force except between the disputing parties and
in respect of the particular case." Id.
101. See id. art. 1136(2). Article 1136(2) specifically provides that "a disputing
party shall abide by and comply with an award without delay." Id. However, a
disputing party may not seek enforcement of a final award rendered pursuant to the
ICSID Convention until 120 days have elapsed from the date of the award. See id.
arts. 1136(3)(a)(i-ii). Final awards entered pursuant to the Additional Facility Rules
or UNICITRAL Arbitration Rules may not be enforced until three months have
elapsed from the date of the award without a request for revision, setting aside or
annulment or dismissal by a court possessing jurisdiction without further appeal.
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in the territory of all parties. 102 In the event that a disputing
party fails to abide by a tribunal's final award, NAFTA's Free
Trade Commission, upon request by a party whose investor was
a party to the arbitration, shall establish a panel pursuant to
Article 2008. This panel must determine whether the disputing
party's failure to comply with the tribunal's final award is
inconsistent with its obligations pursuant to NAFTA and may
recommend that the party comply with the final award. 10 3 An
investor may seek enforcement of an arbitration award against
a disputing party pursuant to the ICSID Convention, the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards or the Inter-American Convention on
International Commercial Arbitration regardless of the
pendency of enforcement proceedings. 10 4
B. THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND TO THE METALCLAD
ARBITRATION
Originally incorporated in 1947 as an Arizona corporation,
Metalclad was reincorporated in Delaware in November 1993.105
The reincorporated Metalclad is a publicly traded company with
approximately four thousand shareholders, including
institutional shareholders throughout the United States and
Europe. 10 6 Metalclad has wholly owned subsidiaries in the
United States and Mexico. Metalclad's subsidiaries in the
United States include Eco-Metalclad, Metalclad Insulation
See id. arts. 1136(3)(b)(i-ii).
102. See id. art. 1136(4).
103. See id. art. 1136(5). Established pursuant to Article 2001(1), NAFTA's Free
Trade Commission consists of cabinet-level representatives of the parties and is
empowered to "(a) supervise the implementation of [the] Agreement; (b) oversee its
further elaboration; (c) resolve disputes that may arise regarding its interpretation
or application; (d) supervise the work of all committees and working groups
established under this Agreement;... and (e) consider any other matter that may
affect the operation of this Agreement." Id. arts. 2001(1) & (2).
104. See id. art. 1136(6); see also ICSID Convention, supra note 81 and
accompanying text; Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38; Inter-American
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, 104 Stat. 448
O.A.S.T.S. No. 42, reprinted in 1 ICCA INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION, GENERAL INTORDUCTION To INTER-AMERICAN ARBITRATION, Supp. 2,
annex 1 (1984).
105. See METALCLAD CORP., 1999 FORM 10-K 3 (2000) [hereinafter METALCLAD
1999 10-K].
106. See id. See also MEMORIAL, supra note 3, 1, at 40.
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Corporation and Metalclad Environmental Contractors. 107
Metalclad's Mexican subsidiaries include Eco Administraci6n,
S.A., Consultaria Ambiental Total, S.A., ECONSA and
COTERIN. 108 For purposes of this article, Eco-Metalclad and
COTERIN are the most relevant subsidiaries. Metalclad is the
sole owner of Eco-Metalclad, which in turn is the sole owner of
ECONSA. 109 ECONSA in turn wholly owns COTERIN. n °0
Metalclad has provided insulation and asbestos abatement
services to refineries, utilities, chemical and petrochemical
plants, manufacturing facilities, commercial properties and
various governmental facilities for over thirty years."'
Metalclad's insulation services include the installation of high
and low temperature insulation on pipe, ducts, furnaces, boilers
and other types of industrial equipment. 12 Metalclad's asbestos
abatement services include removal and disposal of asbestos-
containing products." 3 Metalclad also fabricates specialty items
for the insulation industry and sells insulation material and
accessories incident to its services business to a wide range of
customers and contractors. 1 4 These activities generated gross
revenue of $13.4 million in 1999."15
107. See METALCLAD 1999 10-K, supra note 105, at 3.
108. See id.
109. See Award, supra note 3, 2, at 3-4; see also MEMORIAL, supra note 3, 2,
at 40.
110. See Award, supra note 3, 2, at 3-4; see also MEMORIAL, supra note 3, 2,
at 40.
ill. See METALCLAD 1999 10-K, supra note 105, at 3.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 26. Gross revenue for 1999 consisted of $13.1 million in contract
revenues, $224,850 in material sales and $62,136 in revenues from other sources.
See id. Gross revenue for 1998 totaled ten million dollars with $9.9 million derived
from contracts, $92,227 derived from material sales and $4,250 originating from
other activities. See id. Gross revenue for 1997 totaled $8.9 million with $8.5 million
in contract revenues, $201,900 in material sales and $235,700 from other sources.
See id. However, it is important to note that Metalclad incurred operating losses in
each of the above-referenced years. In 1999, Metalclad incurred operating expenses
of $12.9 million, resulting in an operating loss of $1.6 million. See id. When
combined with its losses from continuing operations ($1.9 million) and its
discontinued operations in Mexico ($2.2 million), Metalclad suffered a net loss in
excess of $4.1 million in 1999. See id. In 1998, Metalclad incurred operating costs of
$9.6 million, resulting in an operating loss of $1.5 million. See id. When combined
with losses from continuing operations ($1.7 million) and its discontinued operations
in Mexico (three million dollars), Metalclad suffered a net loss of $4.7 million in
1998. See id. Finally, Metalclad incurred operating costs of $8.8 million in 1997,
resulting in an operating loss of two million dollars. See id. When combined with
losses from its continuing operations (two million dollars) and its discontinued
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Metalclad first began to seriously evaluate entry into the
integrated industrial waste management business in Mexico in
the late 1980s. Metalclad viewed Mexico as an "exciting" market
for its hazardous waste treatment business "with potential for
increased growth, capital and revenues."116 There was ample
evidence to support this belief. Mexico generated six million tons
of industrial waste annually in the early 1990s.117 It has been
estimated that only 300,000 tons of this waste was adequately
treated in accordance with international environmental
standards.18 The remaining waste was stored on site or dumped
into sewers or at illegal sites. 19 In fact, only one facility in the
entire country offered treatment of hazardous industrial waste
in conformance with international standards. 20 Located in Mina
in the northern Mexican State of Nuevo Leon, this facility has a
maximum annual capacity of 600,000 tons of hazardous waste
and is a nine-hour drive from Mexico's primary industrial areas,
where seventy percent of the country's hazardous waste is
produced. 121
By the mid-1990s, Mexico was generating in excess of ten
million tons of hazardous waste annually. 22 Metalclad
estimated that less than ten percent of this waste was properly
treated. 23 Despite this increase in the amount of hazardous
waste produced in the country, only one additional disposal
facility was in operation. 24 Located in the state of Hermisillo,
this small facility only accepted hazardous waste generated
within the state. 28 Representatives of the Mexican government,
Mexican industry and national and international organizations
were in agreement that "waste treatment and disposal [was] one
operations in Mexico ($2.6 million), Metalclad suffered a net loss of $4.6 million in
1997. See id. All references to currency will be denominated in U.S. dollars unless
otherwise noted.
116. Andrew Wheat, Toxic Shock in a Mexican Village, 16 MULTINATIONAL
MONITOR 1 (Oct. 1995) (quoting Elgin Williams of Metalclad).
117. See Arturo Borja Tamayo, The New Federalism, Internationalization and
Political Change in Mexico: A Theoretical Analysis of the Metalclad Case, Doc. No.
59, Centro de Investigaci6n y Docencia Econ6micas 8 (1998).
118. See id.
119. See id. at 9.
120. See id.
121. See MEMORIAL, supra note 3, at 28. The Mina facility is located near the
city of Monterrey and is operated by a joint venture between Residuos Industriales
Multiquin, S.A. (RIMSA) and U.S.-based WMX Technologies. See id. 19, at 53.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id.
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of the most urgent national development problems."126 Metalclad
was thus justifiably bullish about the potential of the Mexican
hazardous waste industry.
In 1990, Metalclad set a goal of capturing seventy percent of
Mexico's toxic waste management market.127 It was Metalclad's
express intent to "provide a full-service network of locations,
including treatment and disposal facilities, to provide
professional, environmentally safe, handling and disposal of
industrial waste streams."128 Metalclad launched its plan in
1991 through vigorous acquisition and marketing strategies
throughout Mexico.129 In addition to its acquisition of COTERIN,
Metalclad advanced substantial amounts of capital to its
Mexican subsidiaries. 30  Metalclad's subsidiary Total
Environmental Consulting, S.A. was to provide environmental
consulting services while Metalclad's subsidiaries Omega
Chemistry and Potosi Ecosystems were to recycle toxic wastes
and oil into fuels for Mexican industries and provide waste
confinement and incineration services.' 3 ' Capital for the
development of Metalclad's operations in Mexico was obtained
through private placements of common stock and convertible
subordinated debentures and the securing of loans from
financial institutions.132  Most importantly, Metalclad
established contacts with Mexican federal and state authorities
in order "to obtain information about authorizations for
industrial waste-processing facilities." 33  These contacts
included Teofilo Torres Corzo, the governor of the Mexican State
of San Luis Potosi. 34
Located in the eastern half of central Mexico, San Luis
Potosi is a predominantly agrarian state consisting of scattered
small villages that have not shared in the growing prosperity
enjoyed in other parts of the country. As in other parts of
Mexico, hazardous waste disposal constitutes a significant
environmental threat. There are approximately seventy
clandestine dump sites within San Luis Potosi that contain
126. Tamayo, supra note 117, at 5.
127. See Wheat, supra note 116, at 4.
128. METALCLAD 1999 10-K, supra note 105, at 3.
129. See id. See also Wheat, supra note 116, at 4.
130. See METALCLAD 1999 10-K, supra note 105, at 16.
131. See Wheat, supra note 116, at 5.
132. See METALCLAD 1999 10-K, supra note 105, at 16.
133. Tamayo, supra note 117, at 10.
134. See id.
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hazardous waste. 135  With a population of 28,357, the
municipality of Guadalcazar is a county within San Luis
Potosi.136 As in San Luis Potosi, the population is predominantly
rural and resides in small villages. 37 The municipality is
impoverished with no transportation facilities and only one
medical facility. 38 Ninety-nine percent of the homes within
Guadalcazar lack drainage, ninety-five percent lack running
water and seventy-four percent do not have electricity. 39
Residents of Guadalcazar suffer from a high degree of
illiteracy, 40 and the population is highly migratory, thereby
resulting in negative population growth.' 4 ' Most importantly for
purposes of this article, within the borders of Guadalcazar and
one hundred kilometers northeast of the capital city of San Luis
Potosi lies the valley known as La Pedrera. 42
In late 1989, SEDUE closed a hazardous waste landfill
operated by Salvador Aldrett, a Mexican national, located in
Mexquitic de Carmona in San Luis Potosi. 43 Aldrett had owned
and operated the Mexquitic landfill since 1981. As part of its
closure order, SEDUE agreed that Aldrett could relocate the
Mexquitic landfill to La Pedrera.'4 On October 31, 1990,
pending approval of an application to establish the Landfill,
SEDUE authorized Aldrett, by and through COTERIN, to build
and operate a transfer station for the temporary storage of
hazardous waste at the site.145 Upon receipt of the SEDUE
permit and with the consent of authorities in San Luis Potosi
135. See Smith, supra note 28, at C2.
136. See MEMORIAL, supra note 3, 7, at 42. Municipalities in Mexico are
subdivisions of states and are similar to counties in states within the United States.
The municipality of Guadalcazar accounts for 1.69% of the population of the state of
San Luis Potosi. See id.
137. See id. Only five of the eighty-two communities within Guadalcazar have
more than one thousand inhabitants. See id.
138. See id. 7, at 42-43.
139. See id. 7, at 42.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id. 1 7, at 43.
143. See Wheat, supra note 116, at 1. The reasons for SEDUE's closure order are
of some dispute. In his study of the Metalclad Arbitration, Andrew Wheat concluded
that SEDUE shut the Mexquitic landfill due to health and environmental
complaints from local residents. See id. By contrast, in its Memorial filed with
ICSID, Metalclad stated that the closure order was the result of a "political dispute"
between Aldrett and the governor of San Luis Potosi. MEMORIAL, supra note 3, 16,
at 52.
144. See MEMORIAL, supra note 3, 1 16, at 52.
145. See id. 1 16, at 51.
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and Guadalcazar, COTERIN constructed the hazardous waste
transfer station at La Pedrera.146 It is important to note that
Guadalcazar did not require Aldrett or COTERIN to obtain a
permit of any kind prior to the construction and operation of the
transfer station.147 In any event, between the opening of the
transfer station in October 1990 and its subsequent closure by
SEDUE for unauthorized activities in excess of the permit on
September 25, 1991, 55,000 drums representing approximately
20,000 tons of waste were stored at La Pedrera.148 This amount
constituted approximately twenty-eight percent of the
hazardous waste generated on an annual basis in San Luis
Potosi. 149
Despite the closure of the transfer station, COTERIN
continued to pursue its application to operate the Landfill,
conducting soil tests and geological and hydrogeological studies
and drafting environmental impact and risk assessment
statements. 150 In addition to COTERIN's activities, two separate
studies of the suitability of La Pedrera for a hazardous waste
landfill were conducted during this period of time. In July 1991,
Sergio Aleman Gonzalez, a professor at AUSLP, published a
study of the geology underlying the Landfill.' 5' In his study,
Aleman concluded that La Pedrera was unsuitable as a landfill
site due to the existence of numerous aquifers, underground
streams and caverns, the porous nature of its rock strata and
evidence of recent seismic activity in the region. 52 By contrast,
in October 1991, Gilbert Humara Gomez, a consultant retained
by COTERIN, published his findings with respect to the geology
underlying the Landfill. 153 Humara's findings were in direct
contradiction to those made by Aleman. Humara accused
Aleman of falsifying data and claimed that the tests allegedly
performed by Aleman were incapable of being performed at the
time and in the manner claimed. 54 As a result, Humara labeled
146. See id. 17, at 52.
147. See id.
148. See id. 19, at 53; see also Wheat, supra note 116, at 2.
149. See MEMORIAL, supra note 3, 19, at 53. San Luis Potosi generates
approximately 72,000 tons of hazardous waste on an annual basis. See id.
150. See id. 20, at 53.
151. See id. 54, at 68-69.
152. See id. In its Memorial, Metalclad contended that the conclusions reached
by Aleman were suspect due to his resignation from AUSLP in August 1991 in order
to accept a position as a consultant with RIMSA. See id.
153. See id. 57, at 69-70.
154. See id.
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Aleman's study as a "patent sham."155 Rather, Humara claimed
that his tests demonstrated that La Pedrera met all national
and local requirements governing the operation of hazardous
waste landfills. 156 Regardless of the merits of either of these
studies, COTERIN's pursuit of an operating permit for the
Landfill continued unabated throughout the remainder of 1991
and the entirety of 1992.
The lengthy nature of this permitting process took a toll
upon the health of Aldrett, who consequently expressed an
interest in selling his interest in COTERIN. 157 Concerned that
Aldrett's withdrawal would negatively impact the Landfill
project, Mexican federal officials actively sought out and
introduced potential U.S. investors to Aldrett. 158 One such
potential investor was Metalclad. 159 As a result, Metalclad
officers met with numerous Mexican government officials,
including the Secretary and Deputy Secretary for Environment
of SEDUE, the Secretary of Labor, the President and Vice
President of the Mexican Investment Board and the Mexican
Ambassador to the United States. 60 In the meantime, on
January 23, 1993, INE, on behalf of SEMARNAP, granted
COTERIN a federal permit to construct the Landfill. 16' Three
months later, on April 23, 1993, Metalclad entered into a six
month option agreement to purchase Aldrett's interest in
COTERIN, including its issued permits and those in process in
order to construct and operate the Landfill.' 62
Two and one-half weeks after the execution of the option
agreement, on May 11, 1993, the Secretariat of Urban and
Ecological Development of San Luis Potosi granted COTERIN a
state land use permit to construct the Landfill. 63 The permit
was issued subject to the condition that the project adapt to
specifications and technical requirements established by federal
and state authorities. 6 4 The permit was also conditional upon
the concurrence of the San Luis Potosi Congress. 165 As part of its
155. Id.
156. See id. at 1.
157. See id. 20, at 53.
158. See id. 20, at 53-54.
159. See id. 20, at 54.
160. See id.
161. See Award, supra note 3, 29, at 9.
162. See id. 30, at 9; see also MEMORIAL, supra note 3, 22, at 54.
163. See Award, supra note 3, 31, at 9; see also MEMORIAL, supra note 3, 23,
at 54-55.
164. See Award, supra note 3, 31, at 9.
165. See MEMORIAL, supra note 3, % 23, at 55.
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deliberative process, the state congress requested a review of
the La Pedrera site by a group of three geology professors from
AUSLP. 166 The professors determined the La Pedrera site to be
adequate and recommended approval of the state land use
permit, which recommendation was accepted by the state
congress. 167
In order to gain support for the Landfill, Metalclad initiated
a series of meetings with federal and state government officials
after the issuance of the state land use permit. On June 11,
1993, Metalclad officials met with Horacio Sanchez Unzueta,
the newly elected governor of San Luis Potosi, who had declared
during his campaign that the establishment of a hazardous
waste treatment facility within the state was his "highest
priority."16 Unzueta subsequently issued a letter assuring
Metalclad of his support for the Landfill.16 9 Additionally, during
the summer of 1993, Metalclad met with the Secretary of Social
Development, the Mexican Attorney General for the
Environment and the President of INE. 170 Metalclad specifically
alleged that it was told by the President of INE that "all
necessary permits for the landfill had been issued with the
exception of the federal permit for operation of the landfill."171
Metalclad further asserted that the General Director of SEDUE
stated that "responsibility for obtaining project support in the
state and local community lay with the federal government."172
Subsequent to these meetings, on August 10, 1993, INE granted
COTERIN a federal permit for the operation of the Landfill.' 73
Based upon the issuance of this permit and the assurance of
federal and state government officials that COTERIN now
possessed all of the necessary permits to construct and operate
the Landfill, Metalclad exercised its option upon Aldrett's
interest in COTERIN on September 10, 1993.1'4
Metalclad's confidence in the security of its investment was
to prove to be short-lived. In June 1993, Dr. Pedro Medellin
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. Id. 49, at 67. Unzueta was inaugurated as Governor of San Luis Potosi on
May 18, 1993. See id. 48, at 66.
169. See id. $ 49, at 66.
170. See id. 24, at 55-56; see also Award, supra note 3, TT 33-34, at 9-10.
171. Award, supra note 3, 33, at 9.
172. Id. 1 34, at 10.
173. See id. 35, at 10; see also MEMORIAL, supra note 3, 24, at 55.
174. See Award, supra note 3, 35-36, at 10; see also MEMORIAL, supra note 3,
24, at 55-56.
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Milan, one of the three geology professors who studied the
Landfill site on behalf of the state congress, succeeded Dr.
Fernando Diaz Barriga as State Director of the Environment in
San Luis Potosi.175 Barriga's strong support was replaced by
equally strong opposition by Medellin, who reversed his
previous position with respect to the Landfill.176 In November
1993, Medellin sent correspondence to numerous Mexican
federal officials expressing his "official doubts" about the
Landfill. 177 Medellin's withdrawal of support was based
primarily on the results of the previously referenced report by
Aleman.178
Medellin's skepticism with respect to the Landfill
subsequently infected Governor Unzueta, who publicly
announced his opposition to the Landfill on January 9, 1994.179
Unzueta met with representatives of Metalclad on January 28,
1994, at which time he purportedly retracted his opposition to
the construction of the Landfill if Metalclad satisfied additional
technical concerns raised by certain AUSLP faculty members. 80
Metalclad initiated the requested study in conjunction with
AUSLP on February 3, 1994.181 Despite the pendency of the
requested AUSLP study, Unzueta subsequently consented to the
initiation of construction activities at the Landfill site. After
obtaining an eighteen-month extension of the previously issued
federal construction permit from INE, Metalclad commenced
construction on May 16, 1994.182 Barring interruption,
Metalclad estimated completion of its construction activities and
opening of the Landfill on December 15, 1994.183 During the
175. See MEMORIAL, supra note 3, 53, at 68.
176. See id.
177. Id.
178. See id. 54, at 68-69.
179. See id. 61, at 70-71.
180. See id. TI 63, at 71.
181. See id. 64, at 71-72. Governor Unzueta appointed three professors from
the faculty of AUSLP to undertake the requested study of the Landfill site. See id.
64, at 71. These professors concluded that additional permeability, hydrogeology and
underground water flow studies were necessary as well as the drilling of additional
test holes and analysis of resultant core samples. See id. 1 64, at 72. The study was
not completed until April 1995. See id. T 64, at 71. In its Memorial, Metalclad
alleged that the AUSLP professors reached a consensus that "the La Pedrera site
was adequate for a landfill and the project complied with all scientific and
technological requisites." Id. 64, at 72. However, Metalclad further alleged that
Unzueta prohibited the AUSLP professors from issuing their report or publicly
revealing their conclusions. See id. 1 64, at 72 & T 76, at 77.
182. See id. 1 68, at 74; see also Award, supra note 3, 1 38, at 10.
183. See MEMORIAL, supra note 3, 1 68, at 74.
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intervening period of time, Metalclad requested that PROFEPA
conduct an ecological audit of the Landfill in order to dispel
doubts arising from the past operation of the transfer station.184
PROFEPA agreed to undertake the requested audit upon the
condition that Metalclad fund its cost.18
Construction continued on the Landfill without interruption
until October 26, 1994.186 At that time, Guadalcazar served a
notice upon Metalclad ordering an immediate cessation of
construction activities due to the absence of a municipal
construction permit. 18 7 In its Memorial, Metalclad alleged that
the October 26 order was "the first indication by any
governmental official that a municipal construction permit was
essential."188 This cessation of construction activities was
ordered despite the fact that Guadalcazar had no office or
official charged with the issuance and oversight of construction
permits, had never received a request for or granted such a
permit, had never sanctioned any person for engaging in
construction without a permit and had never submitted reports
on its permit activities as required by the laws of San Luis
Potosi. 89 Despite the prohibition contained within the order,
Metalclad alleged that it was directed to resume construction by
Zaragoza Garcia, PROFEPA's delegate to San Luis Potosi, who
assured the company of the primacy of federal approval of the
project over state and municipal concerns.' 9° Nevertheless,
Garcia instructed Metalclad to submit an application for a
municipal construction permit as a gesture of respect for local
government officials. 191 Metalclad submitted its application to
Guadalcazar and resumed construction on the site on November
184. See id. 174, at 76.
185. See id. Initiated in November 1994 and completed on March 28, 1995 by
outside environmental consultants approved by PROFEPA, the results of the
environmental audit were publicly announced on June 6, 1995. See id. at 10 & 14,
at 50. In its Memorial, Metalclad contended that Antonio Azuela, the chief operating
official of PROFEPA, concluded that La Pedrera was "the best site in Mexico for a
hazardous waste landfill." Id. at 11. PROFEPA subsequently issued a public
statement that Metalclad had complied with all federal laws and regulations with
respect to the Landfill and authorized its operation in September 1995. See id. at 12.
Metalclad alleged that the combined costs of the AUSLP study and PROFEPA audit
were in excess of $1.5 million. See id. 74, at 76.
186. See Award, supra note 3, 1 39, at 10.
187. See id. 140, at 10; see also MEMORIAL, supra note 3, 80, at 78.
188. MEMORIAL, supra note 3, 1 80, at 78.
189. See i [ 214, at 141.
190. See id, ' 81, at 79; see also Award, supra note 3, 41, at 10.
19L See Award, supra note 3, 141, at 10; see also MEMORIAL, supra note 3, 181,
at 79.
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15, 1994.192
Municipal opposition continued unabated in 1995 despite
the issuance of an additional permit by INE on January 31,
1995 for construction of the final disposition cell for hazardous
waste and the Landfill's administration building and
laboratory. 193  Construction activities were substantially
completed on March 10, 1995, at which time Metalclad
scheduled an "Opening Celebration" involving over three
hundred invited local and foreign dignitaries. 194 Although
invited, Unzueta refused to attend and, according to Metalclad,
disrupted the event through the transportation of approximately
one hundred armed demonstrators to the Landfill. 195 These
demonstrators allegedly intimidated Metalclad's guests and
blocked access to the site in excess of three hours. 196 Metalclad
further alleged that Unzueta caused armed state police officers
to be placed at the entrance to the Landfill, who stopped,
searched and occasionally denied access to vehicles attempting
to enter the site.197 Refusing to acquiesce in the transformation
of San Luis Potosi into a "national dumpsite,"98 Unzueta and
Medellin urged INE to withdraw its support of Metalclad and
instead support Promoci6n y Desarrollo de Infraestructura, S.A.,
a group of local Mexican businessmen headed by Medellin and
organized for the purpose of building and operating a hazardous
waste landfill in competition with Metalclad. 199 Unzueta also
renewed his objection to the Landfill due to the absence of a
municipal construction permit and threatened to revoke the
state construction permit previously issued to COTERIN in May
1993.200
Despite this ongoing opposition, COTERIN and Metalclad
and the Mexican federal government, by and through INE,
SEMARNAP and PROFEPA, entered into an agreement to
192. See Award, supra note 3, 1 42, at 10; see also MEMORIAL, supra note 3, 1 83,
at 80.
193. See Award, supra note 3, 1 43, at 11; see also MEMORIAL, supra note 3, 84,
at 80.
194. See Award, supra note 3, 145, at 11; see also MEMORIAL, supra note 3, 1 27,
at 57.
195. See Award, supra note 3, 146, at 11; see also MEMORIAL, supra note 3, 189,
at 82.
196. See Award, supra note 3, 146, at 11; see also MEMORIAL, supra note 3, 189,
at 82-83.
197. See MEMORIAL, supra note 3, 1 90, at 83.
19& Id at 10.
199. See id. at 11 & 11 97-98, at 86-87.
200. See id. at 13.
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remediate existing contamination at the site and operate the
Landfill on November 24, 1995 (Convenio).201 The government of
San Luis Potosi initially agreed to participate in the negotiation
of the Convenio but subsequently withdrew from negotiations
and refused to execute the final document.2 2 Commercial
operation of the Landfill was approved for an initial five-year
term subject to renewal by INE and PROFEPA.203 The Convenio
noted the results of the PROFEPA environmental audit,
including the existence of deficiencies and Metalclad's plan for
remediation thereof.2°4 Metalclad's plan required remediation to
occur within the first three years of commercial operation of the
Landfill.2 5 In addition to its remediation obligations, Metalclad
was required to designate thirty-four hectares of the Landfill
site as a buffer zone for the conservation of endemic species. 20 6
Metalclad was also required to make significant contributions to
the community, including performance of social work in
Guadalcazar, the provision of a ten percent discount for
treatment of hazardous waste generated in San Luis Potosi,
employment opportunities, free medical advice, and technical
training for residents of Guadalcazar. 2 7 Finally, Metalclad was
required to consult with government authorities on hazardous
waste matters and provide two courses annually on the
management of hazardous waste to personnel employed in the
public and private sectors. 208
The governments of San Luis Potosi and Guadalcazar had a
two-fold response to the execution of the Convenio. Initially, on
December 5, 1995, the Town Council of Guadalcazar refused to
consider Metalclad's application for a municipal construction
permit.2 9 Metalclad was not notified of the Council's meeting
and was not afforded any opportunity to participate in the
decision process.210 The Town Council specifically noted the
"impropriety" of Metalclad's construction of the Landfill prior to
receiving municipal permission. 21' There was no indication that
201. See id. at 14 & J 40, at 64; see also Award, supra note 3, 47, at 11.
202. See Award, supra note 3, $ 49, at 12; see also MEMORIAL, supra note 3, 40,
at 64; Tamayo, supra note 117, at 11.
203. See Award, supra note 3, 48, at 11.
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See id. 48, at 12.
208. See id.
209. See id. 50, at 12.
210. See id. 54, at 12.
211. Id.
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the Council considered any of the environmental studies
performed with respect to the Landfill, Metalclad's activities
upon the site, or its compliance with the terms of its multiple
federal and local permits and the Convenio. 212 The Town Council
subsequently denied Metalclad's formal request for
reconsideration of its decision with respect to the municipal
permit.213 Unzueta reinforced the Town Council's decision by
dispatching armed state police officers, who stopped and
searched all vehicles entering and departing from the
Landfill. 214
The second response was the initiation of an administrative
petition against the Convenio filed with SEMARNAP on
December 27, 1995.215 Secretary Carabias Lillo subsequently
denied the petition on behalf of SEMARNAP.216 Undeterred by
Lillo's denial, Guadalcazar filed an amparo proceeding in the
Mexican courts challenging SEMARNAP's dismissal of its
complaint on January 31, 1996.217 The presiding federal judge
admitted Guadalcazar's amparo on February 6, 1996.218 The
judge also ordered a suspension of operations at the Landfill
pending resolution of the amparo but permitted remediation to
continue during the proceedings. 2 9 The proceedings remained
pending for eighteen months until August 29, 1997, when
Metalclad received notice that the judge had rejected the
amparo on the basis that, as a municipality, Guadalcazar lacked
standing to initiate such a proceeding.220 However, the order
prohibiting Metalclad from operating the Landfill remained in
force and effect until the expiration of the municipality's appeal
rights.221 As a result, the amparo was finally dismissed and the
injunction against further operations lifted in May 1999.222
212. See id. 51-52, at 12.
213. See id. 54, at 12; see also MEMORIAL, supra note 3, at 16.
214. See MEMORIAL, supra note 3, at 16.
215. See id. 42, at 65; see also Award, supra note 3, 55, at 12.
216. See Award, supra note 3, 55, at 12; see also MEMORIAL, supra note 3, 43,
at 65.
217. See Award, supra note 3, 56, at 13; see also MEMORIAL, supra note 3, 43,
at 65. Under Mexican amparo laws, "a private citizen may request a federal court to
declare any official governmental action null and void as against that citizen on
grounds that the action violates either a specific constitutional guarantee or
constitutes a denial of due process." MEMORIAL, supra note 3, at 170 n.4.
218. See MEMORIAL, supra note 3, J 44, at 65.
219. See id. See also Award, supra note 3, 91 56, at 13.
220. See MEMORIAL, supra note 3, 1 143, at 104.
221. See id. 140, at 104-5.
222. See Award, supra note 3, 56, at 13.
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The government of Guadalcazar and San Luis Potosi
continued their attempts to prevent the operation of the Landfill
in 1996. Despite the granting of an additional permit by INE
authorizing Metalclad to expand the capacity of the Landfill
from 36,000 tons to 360,000 tons annually on February 8,
1996,223 state and local government officials continued to insist
that Metalclad did not have necessary authorization to
construct or operate the Landfill. 224 These officials also
continued to insist that the Landfill was responsible for health
problems plaguing the local population, including the birth of
malformed and brain-damaged children, chronic breathing
disorders and multiple abortions.225 In addition, government
officials issued warnings that the Landfill presented a serious
risk of explosion. 226 Negotiations with respect to the Landfill
continued between Metalclad and representatives of San Luis
Potosi from May through December without success.227 In fact,
the negotiations became so fractious that, in August 1996,
James Jones, the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, threatened to
"blacklist San Luis Potosi as hostile to U.S. investment."228
Metalclad's ever-waning chance of completing construction
and initiating operation of the Landfill permanently ended in
1997. On September 18, 1997, Unzueta entered into an
agreement on behalf of San Luis Potosi declaring a 600,000 acre
portion of the Altiplano region of the state, including La
Pedrera, to be an ecologically protected area in order to ensure
the preservation of twenty species of native cacti. 229 Five days
later and three days before the expiration of his term as
governor, Unzueta signed and published an official decree
implementing the ecological agreement with respect to the
Altiplano region.230 The decree included the entirety of
Metalclad's property in San Luis Potosi and the Landfill. 2 1 The
decree also required immediate cessation of all industrial
activity in the ecological zone, including activities associated
with the Landfill.232 Unzueta's decree was subsequently
223. See id. 57, at 13.
224. See MEMORIAL, supra note 3, at 17.
225. See id. at 19 & 21.
226. See id. at 21.
227. See Award, supra note 3, T 58, at 13.
228. MEMORIAL, supra note 3, at 21.
229. See id. at 26.
230. See id. at 27 & T 146, at 106-7; see also Award, supra note 3, T 59, at 13.
231. See MEMORIAL, supra note 3, 146, at 107.
232. See id.
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reconfirmed by his successor, Fernando Silva Nieto, who
succeeded Unzueta on September 26, 1997.233 San Luis Potosi
officials stated that the decree "definitely canceled any
possibility that exists of opening the industrial waste landfill at
La Pedrera"234 and "expressed confidence in closing ... all
possibility for ... Metalclad to operate its landfill."23 Activity at
the Landfill ceased and the site became dormant.236
Metalclad subsequently determined to discontinue its
Mexican operations in 1999.237 On October 8, 1999, Metalclad
transferred its interest in its Mexican subsidiaries to Geologic,
S.A., a Mexican corporation, for five million dollars and the
assumption by Geologic of all outstanding debts of these
subsidiaries estimated at $3.8 million.238 Metalclad specifically
excluded the Landfill from the sale, the value of which the
company estimated at $4.4 million.23 9
The Landfill ultimately proved to be a financial disaster for
Metalclad. Between 1997 and 1999, Metalclad estimated that it
had suffered losses as a result of its operations in Mexico in
excess of $7.8 million.240 Metalclad's stock also suffered an
eighty percent decline in value.241 The company estimated its
ultimate loss as a result of its Mexican operations at forty-five
million dollars. 242 With respect to recovery of the portion of these
losses attributable to the Landfill, Metalclad was left with one
avenue of recourse, specifically, the investor-state provisions of
NAFTA, having, in its words, "exhausted the limits of its
negotiation resources, and its investment [having been] taken
by political and judicial actions."243
C. METALCLAD'S NOTICE OF CLAIM
Metalclad initiated an arbitration proceeding with respect
233. See Tamayo, supra note 117, at 11.
234. Award, supra note 3, 60, at 13.
235. Id. 61, at 13.
236. See id. 62, at 13.
237. See METALCLAD 1999 10-K, supra note 105, at 3-4.
238. See Press Release, Metalclad Corporation, Metalclad Announces the Sale of
its Mexican Businesses (Oct. 21, 1999) (on file with the author).
239. See id. at 2; see also METALCLAD 1999 10-K, supra note 105, at 13 & 32.
240. See METALCLAD 1999 10-K, supra note 105, at 26 & 32; see also supra note
115 and accompanying text.
241. See Tamayo, supra note 117, at 2-3.
242. See NAFTA Panel Sides with Metalclad on Claim, DOW JONES NEWSWIRE,
at http://www.google.con/search?q=cache:www.. .000081619.html (Aug. 31, 2000).
243. MEMORIAL, supra note 3, 131, at 99.
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to the actions of Guadalcazar and San Luis Potosi with ICSID
on January 2, 1997.24 Metalclad was identified as the sole
claimant, and Mexico was identified as the sole respondent.245
Metalclad alleged that Mexico was liable for injuries arising
from the actions of San Luis Potosi and Guadalcazar for two
reasons. Initially, Metalclad alleged that Mexico was strictly
liable for any breaches of NAFTA by its component states
pursuant to Article 105.246 Second, Metalclad alleged that
Mexico failed to adequately protect its investments in COTERIN
and the Landfill in violation of Article 1105.247
Metalclad stated six separate legal bases for its claim that
the conduct of Mexican federal, state and local authorities
violated Chapter Eleven. Initially, Metalclad alleged that
Mexico breached its obligation to accord Metalclad "treatment in
accordance with international law, including fair and equitable
treatment and full protection and security" in violation of
Article 1105(1).248 This claim had four underlying factual bases.
First, although it represented to Metalclad that it possessed
exclusive authority over matters relating to hazardous waste,
the Mexican federal government failed to override local
opposition to the Landfill. 249 Metalclad alleged that the Mexican
federal government aggressively sought its investment and
repeatedly reassured it that the federal government "had full
and exclusive authority in the area of hazardous waste [and]
that obtaining the federal construction and operating permits,
with the state land use permit, satisfied all the legal
requirements necessary for the Company to open and operate its
landfill."250  Further evidence of federal exclusivity was
contained in the Convenio, which was negotiated and executed
without the participation of the state or municipal
governments.251 Moreover, SEMARNAP's actions throughout
244. See id. at 35; see also Award, supra note 3, 8, at 5. Metalclad had
previously provided Mexico with notice of its intent to initiate arbitration before
ICSID pursuant to Article 1119 of NAFTA on October 2, 1996. See Award, supra
note 3, 1 7, at 5; see also MEMORIAL, supra note 3, at 35. Metalclad consented to the
submission of its claims to arbitration and waived its right to initiate or continue
legal proceedings before other forums as required by Article 1121 of NAFTA on
December 30, 1996. See Award, supra note 3, 91 7, at 5.
245. See Award, supra note 3, 191 2 & 5, at 2-3.
246. See MEMORIAL, supra note 3, 153, at 110-11.
247. See id. 159-65, at 115-17.
248. Id. at 115.
249. See id. 911 166-82, at 117-25.
250. Id. 91 166, at 117-18.
251. See id. 91 167, at 118-19.
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the administrative challenge and amparo proceedings initiated
by Guadalcazar were consistent with federal exclusivity.252
Specifically, SEMARNAP represented to the Mexican federal
court that Metalclad's right to operate the Landfill rested not on
the Convenio, but rather, on the "respective authorizations and
licenses... granted to the Company."253  SEMARNAP
characterized the suspension of Metalclad's operations as a
result of the pendency of the amparo proceeding as an
interference with a "vested right granted in accordance with the
corresponding laws."254  Metalclad relied upon the
representations and actions of the federal government in
exercising its option to purchase COTERIN and proceeding with
the construction of the Landfill.255 However, the Mexican federal
government ultimately failed to defend Metalclad' against the
threats, acts of violence and misuse of state law enforcement
personnel by San Luis Potosi authorities. 256
The second factual basis for Metalclad's claim related to the
subsequently revoked representations of support received by
Metalclad from the government of San Luis Potosi.257 Metalclad
noted the state government's granting of a use permit for the
Landfill on May 11, 1993.258 The granting of this permit was
alleged by Metalclad to have the effect of "ratify[ing] the
sufficiency of the federal construction permit and the primacy of
federal authority."259 Metalclad also noted that Unzueta
expressed his unconditional support for the construction and
ultimate operation of the Landfill in correspondence dated June
11, 1993.260 Furthermore, Metalclad noted that several other
San Luis Potosi officials, including the AUSLP professors who
studied the underlying geology and Medellin, expressed their
approval of the location of the Landfill in La Pedrera.261
Nevertheless, state approval was ultimately replaced with
active resistance, thereby resulting in injury to Metalclad and
its investment in COTERIN. 262
252. See 168-69, at 119-20.
253. Id. 169, at 120.
254. Id.
255. See id. 179, at 123.
256. See id. 182, at 125.
257. See id. at 125.
258. See id. $ 183, at 125.
259. Id. 184, at 126.
260. See id. 91 185, at 126.
261. See id. It 187-88, at 127-28.
262. See id. 1 193-96, at 129-31.
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The third factual basis involved the misuse of public power
and authority by the Unzueta administration. 26 3 Metalclad
noted that the Unzueta administration had utilized the Aleman
Report as a basis for opposing the Landfill despite the
scientifically unsound nature of its methodology and
conclusions. 26 Metalclad noted the false allegations made by
state health officials and broadcast by representatives of the
Unzueta administration that the Landfill was responsible for
birth defects, multiple abortions and chronic respiratory
diseases.265 The Unzueta administration further maligned
Metalclad's integrity through false statements contained within
correspondence forwarded to select members of the U.S.
Congress and Metalclad's largest investors. 266 Upon the failure
of these tactics, Metalclad alleged that the Unzueta
administration illegally deployed state police officers to forcibly
close the Landfill.267 The ultimate closure of the Landfill
through the unilateral creation of the ecological zone in the
dwindling days of the Unzueta administration constituted, in
Metalclad's opinion, a final act of desperation.268
Finally, Metalclad alleged that corruption and abuse of
public trust prevented its investment from receiving fair and
equitable treatment.269 Metalclad alleged that government
officials had solicited bribes on two separate occasions for two
hundred thousand and one million dollars in return for
municipal approval of the Landfill.270 Furthermore, Metalclad
contended that RIMSA, directly or through one of its
subsidiaries, made payments to government officials in
Guadalcazar and funded environmental groups opposed to the
opening of the Landfill.271 The alleged payments by RIMSA and
263. See id. at 131.
264. See id. 197, at 131.
265. See id. 199, at 132.
266. See id. 200, at 133. Metalclad specifically referenced correspondence from
Unzueta to U.S. Senator Paul Simon dated December 10, 1995, which purportedly
contained statements that "cheapen[ed] and discredit[ed]" Metalclad and its
supporters. Id. Metalclad alleged that copies of this correspondence were
subsequently forwarded by Unzueta to Oakes Fitzwilliams and First Analysis
Corporation, Metalclad's largest investors. See id.
267. See id. 204, at 134-35.
268. See id. 205, at 135-36.
269. See id. at 136.
270. See id. 208, at 137. Metalclad specifically identified the municipal
president of Guadalcazar as the official responsible for the solicitation of the bribes.
See id.
271. See id.
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Metalclad's refusal to pay matching bribes were alleged to have
resulted in its inability to overcome municipal opposition to the
Landfill. 22
The second legal basis upon which Metalclad's claims rested
was Mexico's alleged failure to accord Metalclad national
treatment as provided by Article 1102.273 In support of this
claim, Metalclad contended that "[t]he imposition of the
requirement for a construction permit from the Municipality of
Guadalcazar was enforced selectively and singularly upon
[it]."274 In fact, Metalclad noted that Guadalcazar did not have
an office, agency or official responsible for processing
applications and issuing licenses. 275 Metalclad further claimed
that its survey of past and present projects concluded that no
person had ever sought or was granted a municipal permit, nor
was any person sanctioned for failure to obtain such a permit.276
Metalclad additionally alleged that Guadalcazar had not
submitted annual reports to the state government detailing its
construction permit activities as required by state law.277
Furthermore, the necessity of a municipal construction permit
was rendered more dubious by the repeated authorization of
Metalclad's construction activities by agencies within the
Mexican federal government.278 None of these federal agencies
withheld their approval on the basis of the lack of a municipal
construction permit.279 In any event, no mention was made of
the requirement of a municipal construction permit until
November 13, 1995, more than two years after the issuance of
the initial federal construction permit by INE and Metalclad's
subsequent exercise of its option to purchase COTERIN. 280
The third and fourth legal bases for Metalclad's claims
against Mexico were its purported failure to accord Metalclad
most favored nation treatment and national treatment. 281
Metalclad contended that Mexico violated the requirement of
most favored nation treatment established by Article 1103 by
imposing license, permit, testing and study requirements as
272. See id. 1$ 208-11, at 137-38.
273. See id. at 139.
274. Id. 214, at 140.
275. See id. 214, at 141.
276. See id.
277. See id. 215, at 141.
278. See id. 219, at 144-45 & 222, at 146-47.
279. See id.
280. See id. 224, at 147.
281. See id. %J 227-30, at 149-50.
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well as political accommodations upon it which were not
required of similarly-situated persons.282  Furthermore,
Metalclad alleged that Mexico had failed to accord it the better
of most favored nation or national treatment. 283 Specifically,
Metalclad alleged that, by failing to accord it treatment either
as favorable as that accorded to similarly-situated Mexican or
foreign nationals, Mexico failed to meet its obligation to treat
Metalclad in the most favorable fashion as required by Article
1104.284
Metalclad also alleged that Mexico imposed performance
requirements upon it in violation of Article 1106.285 Metalclad
contended that the Unzueta administration had demanded the
transfer of proprietary information to the government of San
Luis Potosi as a condition of its approval of the Landfill. 2 6 In
this regard, Metalclad asserted that state government officials
demanded copies of all of its "drawings, studies, designs,
operating manuals, safety manuals, financial data, and most of
what is necessary to construct and operate a hazardous waste
landfill facility."287 According to Metalclad, there was no legal,
scientific or technological basis for requiring such disclosures.2 8
Furthermore, Metalclad objected to the numerous social service
commitments it had been required to undertake in order to
obtain local approval of the Landfill, including construction of a
laboratory for use by AUSLP professors, the provision of free
medical care, potable water and educational funding for the
community and free consultation with the federal government
on matters relating to hazardous waste. 28 9 While Metalclad
expressed its willingness to provide such benefits, especially for
those in the immediate vicinity of the Landfill, the company
noted that it had no choice with respect to such matters.290
Finally, Metalclad contended that Mexico expropriated
Metalclad's investment in COTERIN and the Landfill without
compensation in violation of Article 1110.291 Metalclad's
confiscated investment included "[an] enterprise, equity and
282. See id. 228, at 149.
283. See id. at 149.
284. See id. 230, at 150.
285. See id. at 150.
286. See id. 232, at 151.
287. Id.
288. See id.
289. See id. 235, at 151-52.
290. See id. I 235, at 152.
291. See id. at 152.
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debt securities, loan to an enterprise, a share in income and
profits, intangible property, commitment of capital [and]
contracts dependent on revenues or profits."292 In addition,
Metalclad alleged that it had been deprived of "its vested right
pursuant to its construction, operating and land use permits to
its investment."293 These deprivations had been imposed by the
Unzueta administration for over two years, thereby rendering
them permanent and irreversible. 294 Furthermore, the taking of
Metalclad's investment was not for a public purpose as
mandated by Article 1110(1), but rather was based upon
"political" and "personal" purposes. 295
Despite these alleged violations of NAFTA, Metalclad noted
that it had not received compensation from Mexico. Thus,
Metalclad sought entry of a judgment in the amount of ninety
million dollars plus costs and attorneys' fees. 296 This amount
represented discounted future profits from the Landfill had it
been permitted to open for business. 297 According to Metalclad,
the profitability of the Landfill was reasonably certain given
"the predictability of the demand for
[Metalclad's] ... services" 298 and the state-of-the-art nature of
the facility.299 Alternatively, Metalclad sought recovery of its
actual investment in the Landfill project, which it valued in
excess of $20.4 million.300 Metalclad also sought an additional
twenty-five million dollars for the negative impact of
Guadalcazar and San Luis Potosi's conduct upon its other
business operations. 301 Metalclad also sought an award of
interest at the rate of nine percent per annum. 30 2
The ICSID tribunal designated to hear Metalclad's claims
was constituted on May 19, 1997.303 The panel consisted of
former U.S. Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti, Jose Luis
Siqueiros, an international jurist from Mexico, and Elihu
292. Id. 239, at 155.
293. Id. 245, at 158.
294. See id. It 249-50, at 160-62.
295. Id. 253, at 163.
296. See id. 263(4), at 166. Critics noted that the amount of damages sought by
Metalclad exceeded the combined annual income of every family in San Luis Potosi.
See Knight, supra note 29, at 2.
297. See Award, supra note 3, 114, at 22.
298. MEMORIAL, supra note 3, 260, at 165.
299. See id. 261, at 166.
300. See Award, supra note 3, 114, at 22 & 123, at 24.
301. See id. 1 115, at 23.
302. See MEMORIAL, supra note 3, at 169.
303. See Award, supra note 3, T 10, at 5.
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Lauterpacht, a law professor from Cambridge, England. 3 4 The
tribunal's first session was held in Washington, D.C. on July 15,
1997.305 The tribunal subsequently determined that the place of
arbitration would be Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada. 0 6
Metalclad and Mexico filed their opening, answer and reply
briefs throughout 1997 and 1998.307 Furthermore, as permitted
by Article 1128, Canada and the United States filed written
submissions with the tribunal on July 28, 1999 and November 9,
1999 respectively. 0 Hearings were held in Washington, D.C.
from August 30, 1999 through September 9, 1999, at which time
both parties appeared and presented the testimony of witnesses
and other evidence. 309 The case was subsequently deemed at
issue in September 1999.310
D. METALCLAD CORPORATION V. UNITED STATES OF MEXICO:
THE ICSID TRIBUNAL'S DECISION
The ICSID tribunal issued its opinion on August 30, 2000.
The Award consisted of fourteen pages of factual findings and
eleven pages of legal conclusions. 311 In its conclusions of law, the
panel addressed four specific issues arising from Mexico's
conduct concerning the Landfill. These issues were: (1) the
responsibility of national governments for conduct of their
subnational components; (2) Metalclad's claim that Mexico's
behavior with respect to the Landfill violated the requirement of
fair and equitable treatment set forth in Article 1105; (3)
Metalclad's claim that Mexico's behavior constituted an
uncompensated expropriation in contravention of Article 1110;
and (4) the quantification of damages, interest and costs
awardable to Metalclad as a result of Mexico's violation of its
treaty obligations.
The tribunal initially addressed the issue of Mexico's
304. See NAFTA Panel Sides with Metalclad on Claim, supra note 242, at 2.
305. See Award, supra note 3, 11, at 5.
306. See id.
307. See id. $1 14-15, at 6 & $$[ 19-20, at 7.
308. See id. 1 24 & 27, at 8-9. Article 1128 of NAFTA provides that "[o]n
written notice to the disputing parties, a Party may make submissions to a Tribunal
on a question of interpretation of this Agreement." NAFTA, supra note 24, art. 1128.
309. See Award, supra note 3, 25, at 8.
310. See id.
311. The tribunal's factual findings were predominantly in accord with the
factual background previously set forth in this article. As such, the tribunal's
findings of fact will not be restated but rather discussed only to the extent necessary
to place its legal conclusions in their proper context.
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responsibility for the actions of San Luis Potosi and
Guadalcazar. 312 The tribunal noted that Mexico had "proceed [ed]
[throughout the arbitration] on the assumption that the normal
rule of state responsibility applie[d]; that is, that [Mexico] can
be internationally responsible for the acts of state organs at all
three levels of government."313 Proceeding in this manner thus
constituted an admission of state responsibility by Mexico. 314
Furthermore, Article 105 placed responsibility for ensuring
state and provincial compliance with NAFTA's provisions on the
federal governments of the signatories. 31 5 This reference to
"state and provincial governments" included local governments
within the states and provinces. 316 The exemptions from the
requirements of fair and equitable treatment and expropriation
set forth in Article 1108 were not applicable to state and local
governments. 317  The final basis upon which Mexico's
responsibility rested was customary international law. The
tribunal summarized customary international law as providing
that "[t]he conduct of an organ of a State, of a territorial
government entity or of an entity empowered to exercise
elements of the governmental authority, such organ having
acted in that capacity, shall be considered an act of the State
under international law."318 This principle held true "even if, in
the particular case, the organ [of the territorial or local
government] exceeded its competence according to internal law
or contravened instructions concerning its activity."31 9
The tribunal then addressed the issue of whether Mexico
treated Metalclad's investment "in accordance with
international law, including fair and equitable treatment and
full protection and security."320 The tribunal concluded that
Mexico failed to accord such treatment to Metalclad's
investment on three separate bases. Initially, the tribunal noted
312. See Award, supra note 3, 73, at 16-17.
313. Id. 73, at 16.
314. See id.
315. See id.
316. See id. The tribunal specifically cited Article 201(2) in support of this
conclusion. Article 201(2) provides that "[flor purposes of this Agreement, unless
otherwise specified, a reference to a state or province includes local governments of
that state or province." NAFTA, supra note 24, art. 201(2).
317. See Award, supra note 3, 73, at 16. Article 1108 does not contain
reservations or exceptions for state and local governments from the requirements of
Articles 1105 and 1110.(1).
318. Id. 1 73, at 16.
319. Id. 73, at 17.
320. NAFTA, supra note 24, art. 1105(1).
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the prominence of the principle of transparency throughout
NAFTA.321 The tribunal defined transparency to mean that "all
relevant legal requirements for the purpose of initiating,
completing and successfully operating investments made, or
intended to be made, under the Agreement should be capable of
being readily known to all affected investors of another
Party."322 The tribunal specifically dispelled "[any] room for
doubt or uncertainty on [any such legal requirements]." 323
Furthermore, once a federal government becomes aware of the
existence of any misunderstanding or confusion with respect to
the establishment or operation of a foreign investment within
its boundaries, it is the duty of such government "to ensure that
the correct position is properly determined and clearly stated so
that investors can proceed with all appropriate expedition in the
confident belief that they are acting in accordance with all
relevant law."324
The tribunal held that Mexico failed to comply with such
duty with respect to Metalclad's investment in the Landfill.
Citing the Mexican Constitution, the tribunal found that the
authority of municipal governments extended only "to [the]
grant[ing] [ofi licenses and permits for constructions
and... [participation] in the creation and administration of
ecological reserve zones."325 Governmental power to authorize
the construction and operation of hazardous waste landfills
resides exclusively with the Mexican federal government
pursuant to the Ley General del Equilibrio Ecol6gico y de
Protecci6n al Ambiente de 1988 (General Ecology Law).326
Specifically, Article Five of the General Ecology Law provides,
in part, that the powers of the federal government include "[t]he
regulation and control of activities considered to be highly
hazardous, and of the generation, handling and final disposal of
hazardous materials and wastes."327 Furthermore, the General
Ecology Law limits the environmental powers of municipal
governments to issues relating to non-hazardous waste.
Specifically, Article Eight grants municipal governments
321. See Award, supra note 3, 76, at 17.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. 8 1, at 17-18, citing CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS
MEXICANOS tit. V, art. 115.
326. See Award, supra note 3, 82, at 18.
327. "Ley General del Equilibrio Ecol6gico y de Protecci6n al Ambiente," at ch.
II, art. 5, § VI, D.O., 28 de enero de 1988.
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authority to adopt "[1]egal provisions in matters of prevention
and control of the effects on the environment caused by
generation, transportation, storage, handling, treatment and
final disposal of solid industrial wastes which are not considered
to be hazardous in accordance with the provisions of Article 137
of [the General Ecology Law]."328 All powers not expressly
granted to municipal governments by the General Ecology Law
are reserved to the federal government.329
Based upon its exclusive authority, the Mexican
government issued construction and operating permits for the
Landfill prior to Metalclad's purchase of COTERIN.330 The
tribunal further noted that the Mexican government assured
Metalclad that all necessary permits had been issued for the
Landfill prior to its purchase of COTERIN. 331 The federal
government also assured Metalclad that Guadalcazar had no
authority to require a construction permit and that any
application submitted to the municipality would be issued as a
matter of course.332 The tribunal found that Metalclad relied
upon these representations in purchasing COTERIN and
proceeding with construction of the Landfill.333 Nevertheless,
Guadalcazar officials denied Metalclad the construction permit
and ultimately proved successful in blocking operation of the
Landfill. The tribunal found that Guadalcazar's success was, in
part, attributable to "[t]he absence of a clear rule as to the
requirement or not of a municipal construction permit as well as
the absence of any established practice or procedure as to the
manner of handling applications for a municipal construction
permit."334 These absences and ensuing uncertainty constituted
a failure by Mexico "to ensure a transparent and predictable
framework for Metalclad's business planning and investment" in
contravention of NAFTA.335
The tribunal also concluded that Mexico failed to ensure
fair and equitable treatment to Metalclad based upon the
absence of procedural due process associated with the municipal
permitting process. The tribunal noted the extraordinary length
of time that elapsed between Metalclad's application for the
328. Id. ch. II, art. 8, § IV.
329. See id. ch. II, art. 7, § XXI.
330. See Award, supra note 3, 78, at 17.
331. See id. % 80, at 17.
332. See id. 88, at 19.
333. See id. 85, at 18 & 89, at 19.
334. Id. % 88, at 19.
335. Id. 1 99, at 20.
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municipal construction permit and its ultimate denial in
December 1995.336 This period of time was particularly
prejudicial given the continuation of construction activities upon
the site by Metalclad at the insistence of federal authorities. 337
The municipal permitting process was further procedurally
flawed by the complete absence of notice of the Guadalcazar
Town Council meeting at which Metalclad's application was
discussed and ultimately denied.33 As a result, Metalclad was
improperly denied an opportunity to be heard on an issue of
central importance to its investment. 339 These deficiencies led
the tribunal to conclude that there was "a lack of orderly process
and timely disposition in relation to an investor of a Party
acting in the expectation that it would be treated fairly and
justly in accordance with the NAFTA."340
Finally, the tribunal concluded that Mexico failed to ensure
fair and equitable treatment to Metalclad based upon the
violation of substantive due process with respect to the
municipal permitting process. The tribunal specifically noted
the absence of municipal authority with respect to all
environmental issues arising from the Landfill. 341 The sole
power possessed by Guadalcazar extended to "appropriate
construction considerations."342 However, Guadalcazar's decision
to ultimately deny the construction permit was not based upon
this limited grant of authority. Rather, the denial was based
upon "the opposition of the local population, the fact that
construction had already begun when the application was
submitted, the denial of the permit to COTERIN in December
1991 and January 1992, and the ecological concerns regarding
the environmental effect and impact on the site and
surrounding communities."343 None of these reasons were
related to construction problems.3 4 Thus, the denial of the
permit was not based upon a legitimate exercise of municipal
authority.345 The tribunal noted that the municipality lacked
confidence in its authority in this regard, thereby necessitating
336. See id. 90, at 19.
337. See id.
338. See id. 91, at 19.
339. See id.
340. Id. 99, at 20.
341. See id. 86, at 18.
342. Id.
343. Id. 91 92, at 19.
344. See id.
345. See id. 93, at 19.
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the filing of an administrative complaint with SEMARNAP
challenging the legality of the Convenio. 346 The tribunal
concluded that the filing of the complaint with SEMARNAP,
coupled with the procedural and substantive deficiencies
associated with the denial of the construction permit, supported
its decision that the insistence upon and ultimate denial of the
permit was improper.347
The tribunal then addressed the issue of whether the
actions of Mexico, San Luis Potosi and Guadalcazar constituted
an uncompensated expropriation in contravention of Article
1110. The tribunal determined that expropriation could take one
of two forms. Initially, expropriation included "open, deliberate
and acknowledged takings of property, such as outright seizure
or formal or obligatory transfer of title in favour of the host
State."34 However, expropriation also included "covert or
incidental interference with the use of property which has the
effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of
the use of reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of
property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host
State."34
9
Applying this definition, the tribunal concluded that the
actions of Guadalcazar, San Luis Potosi and Mexico constituted
expropriation of Metalclad's investment in COTERIN and the
Landfill.350 Initially, with respect to Guadalcazar, the tribunal
noted that what few procedures Guadalcazar had in place with
respect to municipal construction permits were untimely and
disorderly.3 1 Furthermore, no other entity had been required to
procure a construction permit prior to commencing construction
in the municipality.352  The tribunal also noted that
Guadalcazar's denial of the construction permit, "without any
basis in the proposed physical construction or any defect in the
site, and extended by its subsequent administrative and judicial
actions regarding the Convenio, effectively and unlawfully
prevented [Metalclad's] operation of the landfill."35 3 The tribunal
concluded that these actions constituted an indirect
expropriation of Metalclad's investment in COTERIN and the
346. See id. 94, at 19.
347. See id. 97, at 20.
348. Id. 103, at 21.
349. Id.
350. See id. $ 102-12, at 20-22.
351. See id. 107, at 21.
352. See id. T 108, at 22.
353. Id. T 106, at 21.
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Landfill.354
The tribunal also concluded that the actions of the Mexican
federal government constituted an indirect expropriation of
Metalclad's investment. The tribunal restated its previous
conclusion that "exclusive authority for siting and permitting a
hazardous waste landfill resides with the Mexican federal
government."3 5 The tribunal also reiterated that the Mexican
government had represented its exclusive authority in this field
and that Metalclad had relied upon such representations in
proceeding with the purchase of COTERIN and its interest in
the Landfill. 35 6 Nevertheless, the federal government refused to
exercise its exclusive authority when confronted by the
obstinate behavior of municipal officials with respect to the
construction permit.357 By tolerating Guadalcazar's conduct, the
tribunal held that the federal government had effectively
participated in the deprivation of Metalclad's rights with respect
to the Landfill. 358 The tribunal thus concluded that the federal
government had taken a measure tantamount to expropriation
in violation of Article 1110(1). 359
Although unnecessary for its conclusion with respect to the
issue of expropriation, the tribunal held that Unzueta's creation
of the ecological zone encompassing the Landfill provided an
additional basis for its finding of expropriation.3 60 The tribunal
noted that Unzueta's decree creating the ecological zone forbid
any activities inconsistent with a management plan to be
developed for the zone. 361 The management plan was directed at
the diagnosis and remediation of ecological problems existing in
the zone and ensuring its future preservation. 62 In addition,
Unzueta's decree forbid "any conduct that might involve the
discharge of polluting agents on the reserve soil, subsoil,
running water or water deposits" as well as any other
potentially polluting activities. 363 Finally, all activities requiring
permits or licenses were prohibited within the zone unless such
activities related to the exploration, extraction or utilization of
354. See id. T 107, at 21.
355. Id. 1 105, at 21.
356. See id. 91 107-8, at 21.
357. See id. 104, at 21.
358. See id.
359. See id.
360. See id. T1 109, at 22.
361. See id. T 110, at 22.
362. See id.
363. See id.
[Vol. 10:2
2001] METALCLAD CORPORATION V. UNITED MEXICAN STATES 255
natural resources.364 The tribunal held that these conditions had
the effect of forever barring the Landfill's operation.365 The
tribunal expressly refused to consider the intent of the parties
involved in the creation of the ecological zone or the propriety of
their actions. 366 Rather, the tribunal merely concluded that,
although not essential to its decision, the implementation of
Unzueta's ecological decree would, in and of itself, constitute an
act tantamount to expropriation. 36 7
The final substantive issue addressed by the tribunal was
that of the quantification of damages, interest and costs to be
awarded to Metalclad. Although it found two separate
violations, the tribunal determined that the compensation
payable as a result of these violations was identical. 368 The
tribunal reached this conclusion based on the fact that the
result of both violations was the same, specifically, "the
complete frustration of the operation of the landfill, [thereby]
negat[ing] the possibility of any meaningful return on
Metalclad's investment."3 69 Regardless of the source of the
violation, Metalclad had "completely lost" its investment. 370
The tribunal was also confronted with choosing between
Metalclad and Mexico's alternate methods of calculating
damages. Metalclad proposed two methods for calculating
damages. Initially, Metalclad utilized a discounted cash flow
analysis of profits accruing from the future operation of the
Landfill to establish a fair market value of its investment of
ninety million dollars.371 Alternatively, Metalclad calculated its
actual investment in the Landfill at approximately twenty-five
million dollars.372 In addition to claiming the fair market value
of its investment, Metalclad also sought recovery of twenty-five
million dollars for "the negative impact the
circumstances... have had on [Metalclad's] other business
operations."373 By contrast, Mexico alleged that a discounted
364. See id.
365. See id. 109, at 22.
366. See id. 1 111, at 22.
367. See id.
368. See id. 113, at 22.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. See id. 114, at 22.
372. See id.
373. Id. 115, at 23. The tribunal disallowed this additional claim on the basis
that a wide variety of factors other than Mexico's behavior with respect to the
Landfill affected Metalclad's share price. See id. The tribunal concluded that "[tihe
causal relationship between Mexico's actions and the reduction in value of
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
cash flow analysis was not appropriate due to the fact that the
Landfill was not a going concern. 74 Mexico offered an
alternative calculation of fair market value based on
COTERIN's capitalization, which Mexico estimated at between
thirteen and fifteen million dollars. 375 Mexico also offered an
alternate theory of damages based upon Metalclad's direct
investment in the Landfill.3 7 6 Mexico estimated Metalclad's
direct investment to be approximately three to four million
dollars.3 77
The tribunal ultimately determined that Metalclad was
entitled to compensation in an amount equivalent to the fair
market value of the Landfill immediately prior to its
expropriation.3 7 The tribunal held that the fair market value of
a going concern that has a history of profitable operation is
normally based upon "an estimate of future profits subject to a
discounted cash flow analysis."379 However, the tribunal noted
that future profits cannot be used to determine going concern or
fair market value "where the enterprise has not operated for a
sufficiently long time to establish a performance record or where
it had failed to make a profit."380 The tribunal concluded that a
two or three year presence in the market constitutes the
minimum period of time necessary in order to establish
continuing business operations.38'
As the Landfill was never operational, the tribunal
concluded that a discounted cash flow analysis was
inappropriate. 3 2 The tribunal noted that any award based upon
such an analysis would be wholly speculative due to the absence
of reliable evidence upon which it could quantify such loss. 3 3
Rather, the tribunal determined that fair market value could
best be estimated by reference to Metalclad's actual investment
Metalclad's other business operations [were] too remote and uncertain" to support
this additional award of damages. Id.
374. See id. 116, at 23.
375. See id.
376. See id. 117, at 23.
377. See id.
378. See id. 118, at 23.
379. Id. 119, at 23; see also Benvenuti & Bonfant, Sri v. Congo, 1 ICSID (W.
Bank) 330 (1980); AGIP Co. v. Congo, 1 ICSID (W. Bank) 306 (1979).
380. Award, supra note 3, 120, at 23; see also Sola Tiles, Inc. v. Iran, 14 Iran-
U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 224, 240-42 (1987).
381. See Award, supra note 3, 120, at 23; see also Asian Agric. Prods. Ltd. v.
Sri Lanka, 4 ICSID (W. Bank) 246, 292 (1990).
382. See Award, supra note 3, 121, at 23.
383. See id. 121, at 23 & $ 122, at 24.
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in COTERIN and the Landfill.38 4 An award of damages to
Metalclad reflecting its actual investment in COTERIN and the
Landfill was, in the opinion of the tribunal, consistent with
universally accepted principles, specifically, that "where the
state has acted contrary to its obligations, any award to the
claimant should, as far as is possible, wipe out all the
consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation
which would in all probability have existed if that act had not
been committed."385
Metalclad asserted that it had invested $20.4 million in the
Landfill.3 86  This amount was determined by reviewing
Metalclad's U.S. income tax returns, associated schedules and
auditors' work papers reflecting capitalized costs for the
Landfill. 38 7 This amount covered costs arising from the Landfill
from 1991 through 1996, including costs associated with the
acquisition of COTERIN, personnel, insurance, travel, utilities,
professional fees, facilities and equipment.388 The tribunal
rejected Mexico's challenge to these expenses on the basis of a
lack of supporting documentation for each claimed expense.38 9
Rather, the tribunal held that Metalclad's tax filings, in
conjunction with the supporting independent audit documents,
were to be accorded substantial evidentiary weight.390
Furthermore, incomplete records preventing the complete
verification of certain expenses did not render such expenses
fundamentally erroneous and thus unrecoverable. 391
However, the tribunal determined that there were several
expenses that were unrecoverable despite the existence of
supporting documentation or were required to be credited
against the final award of damages to Metalclad. Initially, the
tribunal agreed with Mexico that costs incurred by Metalclad
prior to the year in which it purchased COTERIN were too
remote from the investment in the Landfill to be recoverable. 392
The tribunal thus refused to include expenses incurred by
Metalclad with respect to COTERIN or the Landfill for 1991 and
384. See id. 122, at 23.
385. Id. 122, at 24; see also Chorzow Factory (Germ. v. Pol.), 1927-1930
P.C.I.J. ANN. REP. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47 (1928).
386. See Award, supra note 3, 123, at 24.
387. See id.
388. See id.
389. See id. 124, at 24.
390. See id.
391. See id.
392. See id. 125, at 24.
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1992.393 Furthermore, the tribunal refused to include in its
award of damages costs related to other investments made by
Metalclad in Mexico but aggregated and allocated to the La
Pedrera project.394 Finally, the tribunal held that Metalclad
would be overcompensated if it were permitted to retain
ownership of the Landfill and receive damages. 395 COTERIN
was ordered to relinquish all claim, title and interest in the
Landfill from the date upon which it received payment of the
award.39 6 Furthermore, the estimated cost of environmental
remediation of the site was deducted from the final award of
damages. 39 7
Finally, the tribunal was required to determine the amount
of interest, costs and fees to be included in the award. Citing the
holding in a previous ICSID arbitration, the tribunal held that
interest is an "integral part of the compensation itself, and
should run consequently from the date when the State's
international responsibility became engaged."398 Despite the
existence of multiple dates from which to choose, the tribunal
determined that it was reasonable to conclude that Mexico's
international responsibility became engaged on the date on
which Guadalcazar wrongfully denied Metalclad's application
for a construction permit.399 This interest was to accumulate
from the date of denial of the municipal permit until forty-five
days from the effective date of the award. 400 In order to restore
Metalclad to "a reasonable approximation of the position in
which it would have been if the wrongful act had not taken
place," the tribunal calculated interest accruing during this
period of time at six percent per annum compounded
annually.401 At the end of this period of time, the tribunal
ordered that interest accrue on the unpaid award or any unpaid
393. See id.
394. See id. 126, at 24-25. The aggregation and allocation of expenses arising
from multiple projects is known as "bundling." See id. 126, at 24. While refusing to
apply bundling to the case before it, the tribunal expressly refused to make any
decision with respect to the appropriateness of the concept in other situations, such
as those involving the development of natural resources. See id. 126, at 24-25.
395. See id. 127, at 25.
396. See id.
397. See id.
398. Id. 128, at 25; see also Asian Agric. Prods. Ltd. v. Sri Lanka, 4 ICSID (W.
Bank) 246 (1990).
399. See Award, supra note 3, 128, at 25.
400. See id.
401. Id.
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part thereof at the rate of six percent compounded monthly.402
The tribunal also determined that it was equitable for each side
to bear their own fees and costs attributable to the
proceedings. 4 3 Thus, after deducting the amounts previously
referenced as credits and adding interest, the tribunal awarded
Metalclad $16.68 million in damages.40 4
Neither party to the Metalclad Arbitration was satisfied
with the outcome. Despite its vindication, Metalclad
characterized the tribunal's decision "as Pyrrhic a victory as any
[it had] experienced." 405 Metalclad criticized the amount of the
award as "a token amount of money that doesn't really reflect
the value of the project."40 6 Metalclad noted that "the biggest
losers of all [were] the people of Mexico who continue to have to
live in a country that produces ten million tons of hazardous
waste a year and has only one facility in the whole country to
handle it."407 Mexico expressed disappointment that the tribunal
did not accept its contention with respect to the necessity of a
municipal construction permit. 408 Mexican officials insisted that
the conclusion reached by the tribunal dismissing the necessity
of such a permit intruded upon "the constitutional right of
municipalities to require permission for what happens in their
territory."40 9 Nevertheless, Mexican officials maintained that
NAFTA's investment provisions were operating to their
satisfaction and that Mexico would resist any amendment of
these provisions for fear of encouraging demands for reopening
of other parts of the agreement. 410
402. See id. 131, at 26.
403. See id. 130, at 25.
404. See id. 131, at 26.
405. Anthony DePalma, Mexico is Ordered to Pay a U.S. Company $16.7 Million,
N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 31, 2000, at C4 (quoting Grant S. Kesler, president and chief
executive officer of Metalclad).
406. Id.
407. Id. See also Knight, supra note 29.
408. See Smith, supra note 28, at C2.
409. Id. (quoting Mexican Deputy Secretary of Commerce Luis de la Calle).
410. See MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 43, at 48.
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
III. METALCLAD CORPORATION V. UNITED MEXICAN
STATES: LESSONS LEARNED AND THE FUTURE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION PURSUANT TO NAFTA
A. THE LESSONS OF METALCLAD CORPORATION V. UNITED
MEXICAN STATES
As the first arbitration to interpret Chapter Eleven, there
are numerous lessons that may be learned from the tribunal's
Metalclad decision. Although tribunal decisions do not serve as
precedent, the Metalclad Arbitration will nevertheless
undoubtedly have some impact upon future Chapter Eleven
cases. At the very least, the tribunal's decision creates a
baseline with respect to NAFTA's investor-state provisions from
which all future cases may be measured. Thus, it is important to
examine the general principles established by the tribunal's
decision, their meaning and their potential impact upon future
Chapter Eleven arbitrations.
Two general principles may be discerned from the tribunal's
decision. First, it is clear that NAFTA arbitration panels will
not shirk from interpreting the federal, state and local laws of
the parties and from disregarding official interpretations of such
laws when it suits their purposes. The Metalclad tribunal heard
evidence from expert witnesses retained by Metalclad and
Mexican government officials with respect to the
interrelationship between federal and local law in the area of
hazardous waste regulation. Metalclad's expert witnesses
opined that state and local governments were powerless with
respect to all areas touching upon hazardous waste
regulation. 411 By contrast, Mexican government officials
contended that applicable constitutional and statutory
provisions provided for state and local autonomy in the
regulation of hazardous waste at least with respect to the
issuance of construction permits.412 The tribunal chose to ignore
the official interpretation and instead opted to characterize
Guadalcazar's activities as an illegitimate attempt at hazardous
waste regulation rather than permitted licensing functions. 413
Thus, the tribunal held that Guadalcazar exceeded its
constitutional authority to the extent that it utilized
411. See Award, supra note 3, 85, at 18.
412. See id.
413. See id. 86, at 18.
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environmental impact, rather than physical construction
considerations to deny Metalclad's permit application. 414 The
tribunal expressed no reluctance in so holding and thus
construing Mexican law in a manner contrary to the
interpretation held by the enacting authority itself.
The second general principle that is clear from the
tribunal's decision is its adoption of an American perspective
with respect to its interpretation of state and local laws.
Specifically, the tribunal grafted upon Mexican law, and
presumably would do the same with respect to Canadian law,
sanctity for private property rights not contained within either
body of law. Mexico and Canada do not have internal
protections for private property to the extent recognized in the
United States. Private property rights in Mexico are governed
by Article Twenty-Seven of the Mexican Constitution, which
provides, in relevant part, that "[o]wnership of the lands and
waters within the boundaries of the national territory is vested
originally in the Nation, which has had, and has, the right to
transmit title thereof to private persons, thereby constituting
private property."415 Article Twenty-Seven further provides that
"[p1rivate property shall not be expropriated except for reasons
of public use and subject to payment of indemnity."416 However,
the government is free to impose restrictions upon the use of
private property short of actual transfer of ownership to the
state without incurring liability for associated loss of use.41 7
Thus, private property rights in Mexico are not absolute but
rather serve "a social function," are of "a derivative character"
and subject to limitation by the state.418 These restrictions are
equally applicable upon foreign property owners who are
required to "consider themselves as nationals in respect to such
property and bind themselves not to invoke the protection of
their governments in matters relating thereto; under
penalty... [in the event of noncompliance] of forfeiture of the
414. See id.
415. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS tit. I, art. 27.
416. Id.
417. See id. The government may limit the use of private property "to ensure a
more equitable distribution of public wealth, to conserve [natural resources], to
attain a well-balanced development of the country and improvement of the living
conditions of the rural and urban population." Id.
418. JUAN Jost GONZALEZ MARQuEZ, NuEvo DERECHO AMBIENTAL MEXICANO
(INSTRUMENTOS DE POLITICA) 154 (1997) (quoting Monique Lions, Expropiaci6n, in
Instituto de Investigaci6nes Jurdicos, DICCIONARIO JURIDICO MEXICANO 1389
(1992)).
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acquired property to the Nation."419
The primacy of legitimate government regulation over
private property rights is even more pronounced in Canadian
law. Canadian courts have refused to order compensation for
losses suffered by property owners caused by "a legitimate
government regulation unless the regulation actually transfers
a benefit from the original owner to the government."420
Specifically, Section Seven of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms provides, in part, that "everyone has the right to
life, liberty and security of the person."421 However, unlike the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the
Charter does not assure Canadian citizens of the right to
possess, use and freely transfer property.422 Thus, an aggrieved
Canadian landowner may only prevail if he can demonstrate a
taking of his property by the government for its own use or
destruction.423  Canadian courts have refused to find a
compensable taking in the absence of such governmental use or
destruction, even when the action at issue prohibits all effective
use of the private property.424 Thus, the tribunal's interpretation
engrafts the primacy of private property and American views
with respect to expropriation and other interference on Mexican
and Canadian law. This approach overrides contrary laws and
invites abuse by defining the rights of foreign investors too
broadly at the expense of state and local control.425
419. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS tit. I, art. 27.
420. J. Martin Wagner, International Investment, Expropriation and
Environmental Protection, 29 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 465, 510 (1999); see also
Michelle Swenarchuk, Stomping on the Earth: Trade, Trade Law, and Canada's
Ecological Footprints, 5 BUFF. ENvTL. L.J. 197, 211 (1998).
421. See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms), § 7; see also A&L Invs., Ltd. v. Ontario [1997] 152 D.L.R.4th 692 in
which the Ontario Court of Appeal held that:
the jurisprudence that has developed under the Charter [of Rights and
Freedoms] has made clear that economic rights as generally encompassed
by the term "property" and the economic right to carry on a business, to
earn a particular livelihood, or to engage in a particular professional
activity all fall outside the [Section] 7 guarantee.
Id. at 702.
422. See Wagner, supra note 420, n.212, at 465-66.
423. See A&L Invs, 152 D.L.R. 4th, at 700; see also Steer Holdings Ltd. v.
Manitoba, [1993] 2 W.W.R. 146, 149-50 (Man. C.A.).
424. See Hartel Holdings Co. v. Council of the City of Calgary, [1984] 8 D.L.R.4"
321, 334; see also Soo Mill & Lumber Co. v. City of Sault Ste-Marie, [1975] 2 S.C.R.
78, 83; Sanbay Devs., Ltd. v. City of London, [1975] 45 D.L.R.3d 403, 409.
425. See Evelyn Iritani, Trade Pacts Accused of Subverting U.S. Policies, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 28, 1999, at Al.
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The tribunal's decision also clearly establishes what is not
relevant with respect to Chapter Eleven proceedings. The
tribunal refused to consider the environmental concerns raised
by Mexican government officials with respect to the Landfill.
Rather, the tribunal deemed the motivation or intent of the
state and municipal governments irrelevant.426 In so holding,
the tribunal by implication dismissed the duties of such
governments to serve their populaces and the public policy
reasons underlying their actions. In addition, the tribunal
ignored local opposition to the Landfill. Although non-
governmental organizations opposed the Landfill from its onset,
local opposition did not crystallize until late 1995.427
Nevertheless, the existence and legitimacy of this opposition
was not recognized by the tribunal in any manner whatsoever.
Thus, as noted by one commentator, "[t]he question [for the
tribunal to decide] was really about which authority should
make the final decision and which interests should this decision
reflect."428
The tribunal answered this question in a most authoritative
manner. The tribunal identified the authority responsible for
the decision process in this matter as the Mexican federal
government. The primacy of federal power was first established
by the tribunal's explicit holding that San Luis Potosi and
Guadalcazar lacked constitutional authority with respect to the
ultimate decision to construct and operate the Landfill. Implicit
in this determination is the tribunal's conclusion that any state
or local regulation, including environmental regulation, must
substantially advance legitimate local interests. This holding
recognizes the exercise of the so-called "police powers" by state
and local governments for purposes of protecting the health,
safety and welfare of the local citizenry. Environmental
regulation may fall within the parameters of such state and
local powers. Indeed, it has been noted that "[gliven the
undeniable impact of human activities on environmental health,
and the equally obvious relationship between environmental
health and human welfare, it is clear that regulations to protect
the environment are at least as legitimate as regulations to
address... other governmental concerns."429
However, purported exercises of state and local police
426. See Award, supra note 3, [ 111, at 22.
427. See Tamayo, supra note 117, at 15.
428. Id.
429. Wagner, supra note 420, at 528.
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powers must conform to limitations upon subnational
jurisdiction established by the underlying constitutional
scheme. This is not a novel conclusion in any legal system based
upon principles of federalism. What is noteworthy about the
tribunal's decision is its cordoning off of a vast area of regulation
from subnational interference despite the interest of and its
undeniable effect upon local populations. The tribunal broadly
interpreted Mexico's regulatory scheme with respect to
hazardous waste landfills and unilaterally granted the federal
government sweeping and exclusive power in this area.
According to the tribunal, the authority of state and local
governments was limited to the perfunctory issuance of
construction permits, the creation of ecological zones and the
administration of non-hazardous waste sites.430  Such
jurisdiction did not include matters relating in any manner to
the regulation, control, generation, handling and disposal of
hazardous waste.431 Furthermore, federal omnipotence in this
field was acknowledged despite the protestations of the Mexican
government itself that the tribunal was granting to it powers it
did not exclusively enjoy.
It is also clear from the tribunal's holding that the federal
governments of the respective NAFTA parties have a legal
obligation to intervene pursuant to Articles 1105 and 1110 when
dissident subnational components exceed the limits of their
police powers. The tribunal's holding with respect to Metalclad's
Article 1105 claim stated that, by failing to remedy the flawed
procedures associated with the municipal construction permit
and allay the confusion surrounding the ultimate repository of
responsibility with respect to the opening and operation of the
Landfill, the acts of San Luis Potosi and Guadalcazar became
the acts of the Mexican federal government.432 With respect to
the Article 1110 expropriation claim, the tribunal noted that the
federal government had participated, or least acquiesced, in the
taking of Metalclad's investment by tolerating Guadalcazar's
conduct.433 The mandate to the national governments of the
NAFTA parties could not be more clearly stated. Specifically,
national governments must establish the limits of subnational
jurisdiction existing through the exercise of the police powers
and stringently enforce those limits by taking prompt and
430. See Award, supra note 3, $ 81, at 17-18 & $ 83, at 18.
431. See id. 83, at 18.
432. See id. 100, at 20.
433. See id. 104, at 21.
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effective action against non-complying state and local
governments. National governments failing to act in a prompt
and decisive manner risk being tarred with the same brush that
taints the challenged state or local action.
Even assuming the existence of a legitimate subnational
interest permitting the exercise of the police powers by state or
local government, such exercise was subject to three limitations.
Initially, the tribunal's holding subjects such exercise to a
reasonableness standard. In the context of the Metalclad
Arbitration, the environmental risk Guadalcazar sought to
guard against was required to be real and substantial. 434 This
standard serves to eliminate measures camouflaged as
environmental regulation but designed to serve other purposes
such as the restraint of foreign competition or protection of
domestic industries.438 This standard may be met by the
existence of scientifically supported environmental risk.436
The tribunal summarily concluded that the bases upon
which Guadalcazar objected to the Landfill were not supported
by such evidence. Guadalcazar's denial of the construction
permit was deemed to be without "any basis" 437  or
"consideration of, or specific reference to, construction aspects or
flaws of the physical facility."438 Rather, the repeated issuance of
federal permits to Metalclad and the conclusion and adoption of
the Convenio "show clearly that [the Mexican federal
government] was satisfied that [the] project was consistent with,
and sensitive to, environmental concerns."439 The tribunal did
not identify any further sources for its conclusions. Thus,
without further explanation, the tribunal determined that
Guadalcazar's actions with respect to the Landfill were
illegitimate, while the federal conclusions with respect to the
environment were scientifically supported. The danger of
granting authority to untrained outside bodies unaccountable to
local populations to weigh competing scientific theories
underlying environmental regulation has been aptly noted." 0 It
434. See Wagner, supra note 420, at 530.
435. See id.
436. See id. at 531.
437. Award, supra note 3, 1 106, at 21.
438. Id. 93, at 19.
439. Id. 1 98, at 20.
440. See Wagner, supra note 420, at 534. Wagner specifically noted that:
[i]t is... inappropriate for an outside body that is not accountable to a
country's residents, such as an arbitral tribunal, to attempt to weigh
competing scientific claims to determine whether there is "enough" risk to
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is even more indefensible to have such an outside body reach its
conclusions with only the slightest bit of disclosure of the
evidence upon which it relied.
The second limitation placed upon environmental
regulation involved due process. From a substantive standpoint,
Guadalcazar, and thus by implication Mexico, failed to consider
numerous relevant facts such as Metalclad's efforts to comply
with state and local requirements and its ongoing construction
and operation of the facility." 1 Furthermore, the tribunal noted
that no evidence was presented to any state or local official or
body demonstrating the environmental unsuitability of the site
or failure to comply with specific construction requirements." 2
From a procedural standpoint, Guadalcazar, and hence Mexico,
failed to afford Metalclad an opportunity to be heard by failing
to notify it of the hearing on its permit application.443
Guadalcazar and Mexico further failed to meet the requirements
of procedural due process by permitting an excessive period of
time to elapse without action on the application, while
construction and the resulting injury to Metalclad continued
without abatement.1 " A final procedural failure was the lack of
a transparent framework within which Metalclad could readily
ascertain the identity of the entities empowered to act in this
area and the requirements imposed by each such entity." 5 It is
unclear from the tribunal's decision whether any one of these
acts or omissions standing alone would have been sufficient to
constitute a violation of due process. What is certain is that the
particular combination of events surrounding the construction
and operation of the Landfill violated the guarantee of due
process through the requirement of fair, just and equitable
treatment contained in Article 1105.446
The final limitation placed upon environmental regulation
was the prohibition upon expropriation set forth in Article 1110.
For the first time in the context of an arbitration pursuant to
Chapter Eleven's investor-state provisions, a tribunal defined
expropriation. In addition to "open, deliberate and
justify the [environmental] measure in question, or whether the measure is
supported by the "correct" or "best" or "most accepted" science.
Id.
441. See Award, supra note 3, 51, at 12.
442. See id. $ 52, at 12.
443. See id. 54, at 12 & 91, at 19.
444. See id. 90, at 19.
445. See id. 76, at 17 & 88, at 19.
446. See id. 99, at 20.
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acknowledged takings of property" that have always been within
the commonly accepted definition of expropriation, such
definition also includes "covert or incidental interference with
the use of property which has the effect of depriving the owner,
in whole or in significant part, of the use of the reasonably-to-
be-expected economic benefit of property even if not necessarily
to the obvious benefit of the host state."" 7 Guadalcazar's denial
of the construction permit in the absence of any supporting
evidence, when combined with the lack of an established
permitting process and the representations of exclusive federal
authority upon which Metalclad relied constituted such a covert
or incidental interference.448 The effect of this interference was
to deprive Metalclad of its investment in the Landfill in its
entirety." 9 As if this were not enough, the implementation of
the decree creating the ecological zone standing alone was also a
covert or incidental interference prohibited by Article 1110.450 In
a manner similar to the tribunal's holding with respect to the
requirement of fair and equitable treatment, it remains unclear
whether any one of these acts or omissions standing alone, other
than the ecological decree, would have been sufficient to
constitute an act tantamount to expropriation. What is certain
is that similar actions undertaken by a state in the future raise
at the least the possibility of a compensable taking pursuant to
Article 1110.
After determining the identity of the authority empowered
to act in this area, the tribunal then was required to decide
whose interests should be served by the authority's decision.
The sole interest identified by the tribunal was that of the
investor. According to the tribunal, the investor's primary
interest was its reasonable expectations with respect to the
investment, the governmental action allegedly constituting
expropriation and the foreseeable impact of such action upon
the investment. In applying this reasonable expectations test,
the tribunal specifically noted that Metalclad's sole purpose in
acquiring COTERIN was to develop and operate the Landfill.451
The tribunal further concluded that Metalclad had no reason to
foresee difficulty with respect to its investment given the past
issuance of federal and state permits and official assurances
447. Id. 103, at 21.
448. See id. 11 104-8, at 21-22.
449. See id. 113, at 22.
450. See id. T 111, at 22.
451. See id. %1 77, at 17.
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that exclusive jurisdiction resided with the federal
government.4 2 Metalclad relied upon these actions,4 3 which
reliance was, in the view of the tribunal, justifiable. 454 In
deepening its commitment to its investment, Metalclad was
"merely acting prudently and in the full expectation that the
[municipal construction] permit would be granted."455 As such, it
was Metalclad's reasonable expectation that it would be able to
complete construction and operate the Landfill. The denial of
the construction permit by Guadalcazar, the intransigence of
San Luis Potosi and subsequent backpedaling of federal
government officials with respect to the issue of exclusive
jurisdiction were unforeseeable and inconsistent with
Metalclad's expectation.
Equally unforeseeable was the severity and duration of the
impact upon the investment. Although international tribunals
have refused to require compensation if the challenged
regulation merely prohibited the most economically optimal use
of property, the right to such compensation is clear when the
regulation removes all economic value from the property for an
extended period of time, thereby rendering the investment
useless and nugatory.4 6 In this case, the denial of the municipal
permit was issued after the completion of construction activities
at the Landfill and immediately following the public
announcement of the Convenio providing for its operation.457
Operations were further delayed by the filing and lengthy
pendency of the amparo proceeding.458 Operation of the Landfill
was ultimately barred in perpetuity through the creation of the
ecological zone. 459 The result of these actions was "the complete
frustration of the operation of the landfill [and] ... the [negation
of] the possibility of any meaningful return on Metalclad's
452. See id. 78-81, at 17-18.
453. See id. 85, at 18.
454. See id. 89, at 19.
455. Id.
456. See Starrett Housing Corp. v. Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 122, 154
(1983); see also WAYNE MAPP, THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: THE FIRST TEN
YEARS 152, 155 (1993); Matti PellonpaA, Compensable Claims Before the Tribunal:
Expropriation Claims, in THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: ITS
CONTRIBUTION TO THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 252 (Richard B. Lillich &
Daniel B. Magraw eds., 1997); Rudolf Dolzer, Indirect Expropriation of Alien
Property, 1 ICSID REVIEW, FOREIGN INV. L.J. 41, 62 (1986); Wagner, supra note 420,
at 522-25.
457. See Award, supra note 3, 90, at 19.
458. See id. 95, at 20.
459. See id. 109, at 22.
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investment." 460 This result was severe, permanent and
unforeseeable, thereby mandating compensation.
However, serious questions may be raised with respect to
this conclusion. It is improbable at best that a highly
sophisticated company whose operations, if not carefully
monitored, could pose a serious threat to the environment,
would not have contemplated that its activities would be subject
to controversy and resultant heightened scrutiny. Furthermore,
the chaos, delay and risk that may ensue from dealing with
regulatory bodies in developing states is undoubtedly known to
even the most naive of foreign investors. Metalclad knew of the
mismanagement of the transfer station and its subsequent
closure by SEDUE nineteen months prior to the execution of the
option agreement between Aldrett, COTERIN and Metalclad in
April 1993.461 Metalclad was also aware that COTERIN's facility
had a record of confrontation with officials of San Luis Potosi
and Guadalcazar, and, most importantly, the local population.462
Nevertheless, the company went forward with its investment in
La Pedrera.
Thus, it may be concluded that, having entered Mexico
voluntarily, knowing of the potential environmental dangers
associated with hazardous waste sites, the poor history of the
previous operator and the existence of local resistance on
multiple fronts, Metalclad should bear the risk of adverse
changes in the regulatory environment.463 This conclusion is an
affirmation of the principle that, generally speaking, "[i]t should
not be the function of the international law to insulate the
foreign investor from the regulatory regime of the host state's
laws."464 However, by granting an award of damages as a result
of the totality of Metalclad's experience in La Pedrera, the
tribunal transferred the risk for non-market related aspects of
the investment from the company itself to the Mexican
government. 465 Without NAFTA's expansive provisions on
expropriation, risks associated with foreign investment would be
allocated to the investor itself, who would required to
adequately ascertain their existence, potential impact upon
460. Id. 113, at 22.
461. See supra notes 143-162 and accompanying text.
462. See Tamayo, supra note 117, at 8.
463. See M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENTS
300 (1994).
464. Id.
465. See Aslam, supra note 30.
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operations, and ultimately, acceptability. 466  NAFTA's
expropriation provisions relieve foreign investors of these
burdens through outright risk transference to host
governments. At the very least, such governments become the
de facto guarantors of the success of foreign investors operating
within their borders. Governments thus may be held hostage to
the threat of liability upon an investment's failure for any
reason that may somehow be tangentially connected to
governmental action or failure to act. Such a result may impact
the manner in which a government chooses to operate and is
inimical to its ultimate responsibility to govern in a manner
that best serves the interest of its electorate.
Finally, the Metalclad Arbitration constitutes the first case
in which a tribunal has extensively explored the issue of
damages with respect to violations of Chapter Eleven's investor-
state provisions. Initially, the tribunal's decision established the
formula upon which awards of damages are to be calculated. In
this regard, the tribunal adopted the measure of damages set
forth by the Permanent Court of International Justice in
Chorzow Factory467as the measure of damages for violations of
Articles 1105 and 1110.48 Specifically, the tribunal held that
"where the state has acted contrary to its obligations, any award
to the claimant should, as far as is possible, wipe out all the
consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation
which would in all probability have existed if that act had not
been committed."469 The consequences of Mexico's illegal
behavior could best be erased by awarding Metalclad an amount
of damages equal to its actual investment in COTERIN and the
Landfill.470 This measure of damages is applicable in cases
alleging violations of either Articles 1105 or 1110, assuming
that the investor has suffered a complete frustration of its
purpose in making the investment and the negation of any
meaningful return thereon.471 The amount of such actual
investment is capable of proof through tax filings and
supporting independent audit documents, which are to be
accorded substantial weight by arbitral panels. 472
466. See id.
467. Chorzow Factory (Ger. v. Pol.), 1927-1930 P.C.I.J. ANN. REP. (ser. A) No.
17, at 47 (1928).
468. See Award, supra note 3, 122, at 24.
469. Id.
470. See id.
471. See id. 113, at 22.
472. See id. 124, at 24.
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The tribunal also itemized those expenses that may or may
not be included in the determination of the amount of the actual
investment. Included within this award are out-of-pocket
expenses arising directly from the investment, including costs
associated with acquisition, personnel, insurance, travel,
utilities, equipment and professional expenses. 473 However, the
tribunal made clear that other less direct costs will be subject to
stricter scrutiny. For example, preparatory costs incurred by an
investor prior to the date of its actual investment in the host
state are too remote to be included in the amount of the actual
investment.474 Furthermore, bundled costs will not be routinely
included in the calculation of the actual investment.475 Rather,
bundling may only be utilized when deemed "appropriate,"
although the exact circumstances meeting this requirement
remain uncertain. 476 Equally excludable are damages arising
from the loss of share price.477 In order to obtain such an award,
the investor must be able to demonstrate the existence of a
direct causal relationship between the action that negatively
impacted the investment and the investor's share price with an
unspecified degree of certainty.478 Reductions in share value
that are remote or attributable to other factors unrelated to the
investment will not be included in an award of damages.479
The tribunal's decision also established guidelines for the
inclusion of lost profits as an element of damages. While
acknowledging that the fair market value of an investment may
include an estimate of future profits utilizing discounted cash
flow analysis, the tribunal established three criteria that
investors must satisfy in order to receive such an award.480
Initially, the investment for which such an award is sought
must have operated at a profit to the investor.48' Second, the
investment must have operated for "a sufficiently long time to
establish a performance record." 4 2 In one of the few elaborations
contained within the portion of the opinion devoted to damages,
the tribunal indicated that the investment must have operated
473. See id. 123, at 24.
474. See id. 125, at 24.
475. See id. 126, at 24-25.
476. Id. 126, at 25.
477. See id. 115, at 23.
478. See id.
479. See id.
480. See id. 119, at 23.
481. See id. 120, at 23.
482. Id.
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for a minimum of two or three years in order to qualify for an
award of future profits.483 Finally, the requested award of future
profits must be reasonably ascertainable and not "wholly
speculative."4 8 4 The tribunal offered no further explanation of
this standard or the evidence that would render the amount of
such loss reasonably ascertainable.
Two final items with respect to damages may be important
to future Chapter Eleven claims arising from environmental
regulation. First, with little explanation or fanfare, the tribunal
noted that COTERIN would be required to relinquish all claim,
title and interest in the Landfill upon satisfaction of the award
by Mexico. 485 The tribunal further noted that, at such time, the
Landfill may require environmental remediation.48 6 Thus, any
award that failed to take into account the need to remediate the
site would serve to ignore COTERIN's legal obligations and
unjustly enrich the company.487 As such, the tribunal deducted
the anticipated cost of remediation from the final award of
damages to Metalclad. 488 Despite the probability that expenses
associated with environmental remediation could constitute
substantial credits against awards of damages to investors in
future investor-state actions pursuant to Chapter Eleven, the
tribunal failed to disclose the amount of such credit or the basis
by which it arrived at such amount.489
Finally, the tribunal's holding with respect to interest to be
included in an award of damages is worthy of review. First,
following accepted international practice, the tribunal held that
the accrual date for an award of interest pursuant to NAFTA's
investor-state provisions is the date of engagement of the host
state's responsibility.490 In most cases, this date is ascertainable
with reasonable certainty. However, Mexico's liability was
founded upon "an accumulation of a number of factors."491 Thus,
the tribunal was confronted with several dates from which
interest could accrue. By selecting December 5, 1995, the date
on which Guadalcazar denied Metalclad's application for a
483. See id.
484. Id. 121, at 23.
485. See id. 127, at 25.
486. See id.
487. See id.
488. See id.
489. See id.
490. See id. 1 128, at 25 (citing Asian Agric. Prods. v. Sri Lanka, 4 ICSID (W.
Bank) 245, 294 (1990).
491. Award, supra note 3, 91 128, at 25.
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construction permit, the tribunal selected the most conservative
of dates.492 Mexico's international responsibility and Metalclad's
damages may have accrued far earlier in time. State
responsibility may have accrued as early as September 1993
when, relying upon assurances of exclusive federal jurisdiction,
Metalclad exercised its option to purchase COTERIN. 493 State
responsibility also may have attached in October 1994 when
federal authorities failed to timely intervene to prevent
cessation of construction activities by order of the Guadalcazar
Town Council. 494 Finally, an award of interest from March 1995
would recognize Mexico's liability for its failure to prevent
Unzueta's posting of armed protesters at the entrance to the
Landfill.495 Instead, the tribunal chose a date long after state
responsibility had attached and Metalclad had suffered
ascertainable injury. This conservative interpretation should
serve as a lesson to future Chapter Eleven claimants. Further
lessons may be ascertained from the tribunal's failure to
elaborate on the method by which it chose the applicable rate.496
B. THE METALCLAD ARBITRATION AND THE FUTURE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION PURSUANT TO NAFTA
There are significant consequences for future
environmental regulation in the United States as a result of the
Metalclad Arbitration. However, serious implications for future
environmental regulation may arise from the mere assertion of
such claims. The mere assertion of claims such as those
advanced by Metalclad may have a drastic impact upon the
willingness and ability of state and local governments to adopt
environmental regulations that interfere with American,
Canadian or Mexican investments or otherwise disrupt their
operation or profitability. The threat posed by potential claims
may chill future state and local environmental regulation,
thereby freezing such regulation in its present state. The
resultant regulatory gridlock may prove to be incapable of
responding to environmental emergencies as well as scientific
advances in an adequate fashion. The Metalclad Arbitration and
other pending challenges to environmental regulation asserted
492. See id.
493. See supra notes 159-174 and accompanying text.
494. See supra notes 186-192 and accompanying text.
495. See supra notes 193-200 and accompanying text.
496. See Award, supra note 3, 128, at 25.
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pursuant to NAFTA's Chapter Eleven have opened a proverbial
Pandora's Box of unintended and unanticipated consequences
for future environmental regulation. Only through the decisive
action of the parties themselves may Chapter Eleven be
returned to its intended place within NAFTA.
Initially, claims such as those recognized in the Metalclad
Arbitration have the effect of strengthening the conclusion that
NAFTA, and in particular Chapter Eleven, favors trade law over
every form of domestic law. 497 This favoritism comes at the
expense of environmental laws, which are subordinated to the
right of nationals of the parties to make a profit through
unfettered exploitation of their investments in the territories of
other parties.498 After all, as aptly noted by the Sierra Club of
Canada, "[olne man's environmental regulation is another man's
non-tariff trade barrier."499 If environmental regulation is
treated as merely another non-tariff barrier to be overcome,
NAFTA is truly reduced to "a tool in the hands of corporations
desperate to protect their bottom line, no matter what the cost
to human health or the environment." 500  Meaningful
environmental measures will be unable to be adopted or
enforced if such measures conflict with the profitability of an
investment of a national of another party.50 1 The right of all
parties and their constituencies to significant environmental
protection is thus rendered a nullity.
Such an interpretation is inconsistent with the objectives of
NAFTA with respect to the environment. 50 2 NAFTA's Preamble
evidences the parties' intent to "[e]nsure a predictable
commercial framework for business planning and
investment.., in a manner consistent with environmental
protection and conservation."50 3 The Preamble also evidences
the parties' resolve to "[p]romote sustainable
development... [and] [sitrengthen the development and
enforcement of environmental laws and regulations."5°4 The
497. See Knight, supra note 29; see also Knight, supra note 31.
498. See Peterson, supra note 33, at Al.
499. Examining Canada's Priority Interests at the WTO/FTAA Negotiations:
How Not to Promote Environmental Protection (Sierra Club of Canada, Ottawa,
Ont.), July 1999, at 2 [hereinafter Canada's Priority Interests].
500. Latest NAFTA Lawsuit Proves Threat of Chapter Eleven to Health and
Environmental Laws, Again, supra note 35, at 1 (quoting Angela Rickman of the
Sierra Club of Canada).
501. See id.
502. See MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 43, at 6-7.
503. NAFTA, supra note 24, at pmbl.
504. Id.
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primacy of the parties' intent with respect to environmental
protection is specifically recognized in Article 1114 which
provides that "In]othing in ... Chapter [Eleven] shall be
construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or
enforcing any measure.., that it considers appropriate to
ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in
a manner sensitive to environmental concerns."505 These goals
are further developed in the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation, which promotes environmental
preservation and protection, sustainable development and the
enhanced enforcement of environmental laws.506 The North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation also
entitles the parties to "establish [their] own levels of domestic
environmental protection... [to ensure] high levels of
environmental protection... "507 However, if environmental
measures are subject to challenges pursuant to Chapter Eleven,
505. Id. art. 1114(1). However, it bears to note that Article 1114(1) appears on
its face to require that the environmental measure be specifically directed at
investment activities conducted within the territory of a Party rather than
environmental measures of general application. Included within such measures may
be such specific regulations as those associated with land use planning, zoning and
construction. In any event, all such measures must be consistent with Chapter
Eleven's provisions. See id.
506. See North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 8,
1993, art. 1 (a-j), 32 I.L.M. 1480. Article 1 specifically provides that the objectives of
the Agreement are to:
(a) foster the protection and improvement of the environment in the
territories of the Parties for the well-being of present and future
generations; (b) promote sustainable development based on cooperation
and mutually supportive environmental and economic policies; (c) increase
cooperation between the Parties to better conserve, protect, and enhance
the environment, including wild flora and fauna; (d) support the
environmental goals and objectives of the NAFTA; (e) avoid creating trade
distortions or new trade barriers; (f) strengthen cooperation on the
development and improvement of environmental laws, regulations,
procedures, policies and practices; (g) enhance compliance with, and
enforcement of, environmental laws and regulations; (h) promote
transparency and public participation in the development of environmental
laws, regulations and policies; (i) promote economically efficient and
effective environmental measures; and (j) promote pollution prevention
policies and practices.
Id.
For a complete discussion of the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation, see PIERRE M. JOHNSON & ANDRE BEAULIEU, THE ENVIRONMENT AND
NAFTA: UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEMENTING THE NEW CONTINENTAL LAW 119-276
(1996).
507. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note
506, art. 3.
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it will be inordinately difficult, if not impossible, to achieve
NAFTA's goals of strengthening environmental protection while
respecting differing levels of such protection.50 8
Furthermore, the challenge posed to environmental
regulations by Chapter Eleven were not contemplated by the
parties. 509 Metalclad may have succeeded in expanding the term
"expropriation" in directions that were arguably never
anticipated by the parties. The United States and Canada
viewed Chapter Eleven as serving "to liberalize the investment
regime in Mexico, where constraints on foreign investment were
widespread and accompanied by a view of the national ability to
expropriate foreign investments that reflected a very bifurcated
North-South view of the relationship between a state and a
foreign investor."510 By contrast, Mexico viewed Chapter Eleven
as a method by which to attract investors through the
enhancement of security and predictability.511 Metalclad has
thus arguably misappropriated Chapter Eleven through its use
as "a potent offensive strategic tool" rather than its intended
role as "a defensive investor protection mechanism."512
Unfortunately, there are no specific drafting records that
elaborate upon the intended scope of Article 1110's
expropriation provisions. 513 Arbitral panels are thus left without
guidance with respect to the boundaries of expropriation as
contemplated by the parties.
The interpretation of Chapter Eleven reached by the
Metalclad tribunal also unwisely grants adversely affected
investors who have failed to thwart environmental regulation at
the domestic level an additional avenue of attack utilizing
NAFTA.51 4 In this regard, the Metalclad Arbitration can be
characterized as an attempt to utilize NAFTA as a tool to
rewrite the decisions of Mexican authorities with respect to the
Landfill upon the failure of Metalclad's domestic campaign
508. See MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 43, at 46.
509. See Brevetti & Nagel, supra note 1, at 1375; see also Aslam, supra note 30;
Knight, supra note 29.
510. MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 43, at 12.
511. See id.
512. Id. at 15. David Schorr, the Director of the World Wildlife Fund's
Sustainable Commerce Program, has noted that, "[ilnstead of protecting investors,
NAFTA's rules are being used to attack legitimate environmental policies." NAFTA
Used to Attack California Clean Water Move, ENV'T NEWS SERVICE, available at
http:/ ens.lycos.com/ens/jun99/1999L-06-24-04.html (June 24, 1999).
513. See MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 43, at 45.
514. See Canada's Priority Interests, supra note 499, at 2.
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against such measures. 515 As noted by Howard Mann and
Konrad von Moltke in their study of the impact of Chapter
Eleven on environmental regulation for the International
Institute for Sustainable Development, "the investor-state
process of NAFTA has now become part of a dynamic
institutional response by foreign business owners to government
action in all public policy areas with an impact on their costs
and competitiveness, with a large focus of this activity aimed at
environmental measures."516
Such an institutional response grants industry an
unhealthy privileged access to public policy-making processes
and is an unprecedented intrusion upon such processes. 517
Foreign investors, with no interests to consider other than their
own operations and profits, possess an undue advantage over
host governments with respect to issues of environmental
regulation. 518 Rather than raising environmental issues with
host governments in the context of balancing public and private
interests to reach a compromise acceptable to all, foreign
investors may now bring the threat of damages awarded in the
context of a Chapter Eleven proceeding to bear upon their host
governments during crucial stages of the public policy process. 51 9
Such threats or perceived threats could significantly interfere
with the sovereignty of host states by restricting the ability of
democratically elected governments to legislate on critical
matters of environmental protection. 520  The potential
deleterious effects upon state sovereignty in general and
environmental regulation in particular are enhanced by the
presence of more than 350 million individuals and corporations
located throughout the territory of the parties.521 Governments
at all levels can and should take action with respect to issues
concerning environmental protection in their capacity as the
caretakers of public safety and the common good. Any
government that hesitates or refuses to act because it may have
515. See NAFTA Used to Attack California Clean Water Move, supra note 512, at
2.
516. MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 43, at 15.
517. See id. at 6.
518. See id. at 14.
519. See id. at 18.
520. See Michelle Sforza & Mark Vallianatos, Ethyl Corporation v. Government
of Canada: Now Investors Can Use NAFTA to Challenge Environmental Safeguards,
3 PUBLIC CITIZEN GLOBAL TRADE WATCH 3 (1997), available at http://
www.citizen.org/pctrade/nafta/cases/ethylbri/htm.
521. See id.
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to pay compensation to foreign companies is well on its way to
abdicating its sovereignty. Chapter Eleven's investor-state
provisions are objectionable to the extent they place the
constituent governments of the parties on the path toward
losing their power to adopt environmental protection measures.
The dispute resolution procedures established by Chapter
Eleven are equally inimical to public policy-making processes.
Chapter Eleven's dispute resolution processes lack necessary
procedural and public interest safeguards. The dispute
resolution procedures allow foreign investors "to sidestep [such]
safeguards in favour of a non-transparent, secretive system of
arbitration with no right of appeal." 22 Increasingly complex
issues are determined behind closed doors by arbitrators
possessing little or no competence to examine the dispute from a
scientific, environmental or public health standpoint.523
Furthermore, Chapter Eleven's procedures ignore the necessity
of multi-stakeholder consultations on issues of public interest
such as the environment. 524 Instead, Chapter Eleven encourages
governments to litigate public interest issues in a secretive
manner in which the interests of only one party are presented
and considered.5 25 Hence, the wisdom of Mexico's decision to
prohibit the operation of the Landfill occurred solely in the
context of Metalclad's narrow commercial interests without any
input from Guadalcazar, San Luis Potosi or any other local
Mexican jurisdiction or authority. 26 Metalclad thus succeeded
in using NAFTA to override all local opposition to the operation
of the Landfill. The lack of public access to information and
records, the consequent lack of adequate public knowledge of
ongoing arbitration proceedings and absence of national judicial
review are further evidence of the need for procedural and
public interest safeguards.52 7 Although such procedures are well
accepted in commercial arbitration between private parties,
they are as yet uncommon, and should remain so, in areas
where significant public policy issues are at stake.528 The effect
of transplantation of such procedures to public policy issues
substitutes the authority of international panels established for
522. MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 43, at 3.
523. See Canada's Priority Interests, supra note 499, at 2.
524. See MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 43, at 6.
525. See id.
526. See Brevetti & Nagel, supra note 1, at 2; see also Knight, supra note 29.
527. See MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 43, at 18.
528. See id. at 14.
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the primary purpose of defending the private interests of foreign
investors for the provisions of constitutional governance. 529 This
substitution serves to undermine the democratic legitimacy of
the dispute resolution process.5 30
Chapter Eleven's dispute resolution procedures also create
an unfair advantage for foreign investors at the expense of
domestic companies. Although foreigi investors are permitted to
mount full-scale assaults upon a potentially limitless number of
measures adopted by their host states, domestic companies are
prohibited from engaging in such attacks through their
exclusion from Chapter Eleven's protections. NAFTA's creation
of a right for foreign investors to seek damages arising from the
adoption of measures, including environmental laws and
regulations, by a host state raises the issue of equivalent rights
for domestic investors. 531 In the case of the Landfill, similarly
situated Mexican companies could not seek compensation
pursuant to NAFTA such as may be sought by their American
and Canadian counterparts. If one of the purposes of Chapter
Eleven's investor-state provisions was to level the field of play
for foreign investors, it may be legitimately questioned whether
a drastic and powerful procedural weapon provided to foreign
investors should not also be provided to domestic investors.
Although this would be an equitable result, such an extension
would have potentially disastrous consequences for regulation
at all levels of government, would overwhelm already
overcrowded administrative and judicial dockets, and could
require the payment of hundreds of millions of dollars in
compensation.
Adoption of the Metalclad tribunal's interpretation of
Chapter Eleven's investor-state provisions also imperils the
long-assumed right of the general public to a clean and healthy
environment. 532 Chapter Eleven creates a right for a foreign
investor to be compensated when measures adopted by its host
state negatively affect its operations, profitability or share
value. In the case of environmental measures, this right to
compensation "is treated as the moral equivalent of the public's
529. See Sforza & Vallianatos, supra note 520, at 2-3.
530. See MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 43, at 7.
531. See id. at 16.
532. See Peterson, supra note 33, at Al. Daniel E. Seligman, a trade policy
analyst for the Sierra Club, has noted that "[b]efore these trade rules came along, we
thought it was our right to have clean air and clean water. [These cases] show that
we have to pay foreign companies to maintain that right." Id.
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right not to be harmed by industrial toxins." 33 It has been aptly
noted that this equivalency further encourages attacks upon
environmental measures by sending a "strong message to
investors that demanding compensation from the public for the
inconvenience of complying with environmental regulations
constitutes a legitimate and lucrative business strategy." 34
However, it is inappropriate to require the payment of
compensation for regulatory adjustments in environmental
regulation. Such a result would amount to utilization of public
funds to pay for the government's right to regulate the
environment. Such a state of affairs has been accurately
characterized as "an entirely perverse result in light of the
ascendancy of the polluter-pays principle in national and
international environmental law."535 Since first elaborated upon
by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
in 1972,536 the "polluter-pays principle" provides that the
general public effectively owns the environment. 537 Those
persons who cause injury to the environment must compensate
the public for the damage they cause. 538 However, Chapter
Eleven's investor-state provisions reverse this principle by
requiring the public to pay for the right to regulate the
environment. 539 This right only extends to the depths of the
government's coffers.5 40  Thus, Chapter Eleven effectively
transfers ownership of the environment to the polluter, who
may thus use and pollute it with impunity.541 Such a result is
indeed perverse and is a reversal of almost thirty years of
accepted international environmental practice.
Additionally, the certainty for foreign investors provided by
Chapter Eleven has come at the expense of certainty and
predictability for environmental regulators. 542 Regulators must
consider each potential Chapter Eleven claim with very limited
ability to predict the likelihood of their success.5 43 Such
533. Sforza & Vallianatos, supra note 520, at 2.
534. Id.
535. MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 43, at 5.
536. See generally ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., THE POLLUTER PAYS
PRINCIPLE: OECD ANALYSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1992).
537. See John Moffet & Francois Bregha, The Role of Law Reform in the
Promotion of Sustainable Development, 6 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 1, 8 (1996).
538. See id.
539. See id.
540. See Sforza & Vallianatos, supra note 520, at 3.
541. See Moffet & Bregha, supra note 537, at 8.
542. See MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 43, at 2.
543. See id. at 19-20.
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uncertainty and the burden associated with considering every
potential claim may dissuade governments from adopting
environmental measures in the future.5 " The democratic
decision-making process is derailed to the extent that the threat
of Chapter Eleven claims dissuades governments from acting to
protect the environment.5 45 At the very least, the threat of
litigation pursuant to Chapter Eleven significantly increases the
actual cost of the regulatory process and potential cost through
the payment of future claims. 546 Such dissuasion and increase in
the cost of environmental regulation have the potential to result
in regulatory freeze.547 Settlements of claims by national
governments only serve to deepen this regulatory freeze at the
state and local level as well as legitimize the further use of the
investor-state provisions to challenge environmental laws. Such
a regulatory freeze is unacceptable given the ever-increasing
body of scientific knowledge, including the impact of industrial
processes and natural resource exploitation on the environment,
as well as evolving public perceptions. 548 At the worst, existing
environmental standards may be eroded or completely erased,
thereby leading to the creation of "pollution havens" and "a
general race to the bottom" for environmental standards. 549
Finally, the interpretation of Chapter Eleven reached by the
Metalclad tribunal threatens to undermine public perceptions of
NAFTA. Already besieged by controversy on a number of fronts
by a diverse coalition of interests, the dismantling of
environmental regulation at the behest of foreign investors,
whether perceived or actual, threatens public support for
NAFTA as well as future efforts to liberalize trade and
investment.550 The need for this public support is even more
crucial given the growing tide of opposition to further
globalization as evidenced by the inability of the Clinton
Administration to obtain "fast-track" negotiating authority, the
collapse of negotiations on the Multilateral Agreement on
Investment in October 1998 and the disruptions at the World
Trade Organization's meeting in Seattle in November 1999.551
The adoption of the Metalclad tribunal's interpretation of
544. See Aslam, supra note 30; see also Knight, supra note 29.
545. See Sforza & Vallianatos, supra note 520, at 2.
546. See MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 43, at 17.
547. See id. at 5.
548. See id. at 46.
549. Id. at 3.
550. See id. at 7.
551. See id. at 62-63.
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Chapter Eleven or, at the very least, the failure to address the
relationship between domestic environmental regulation and
the investor-state provisions of NAFTA renders it "unlikely
that.., public mistrust and antipathy.., can be reversed to
develop the needed public support for continued trade
liberalization in the World Trade Organization and [NAFTAI,
and the launching of new investment negotiations."5 2 There is
no better time for the parties to address this relationship than
the present rather than await the filing of new claims and
further erosion of public support.
IV. CONCLUSION
Regardless of whether one accepts the line of reasoning and
conclusions reached in this article, it is abundantly clear that
there is no simple formula for distinguishing between
compensable and non-compensable regulatory activities. 553 Such
uncertainty may undermine effective investor protection as well
as place legitimate government regulatory activity at risk.554 It
thus comes as no surprise that numerous non-governmental
organizations, including the Council of Canadians, Public
Citizen, the Sierra Club and the World Wildlife Fund, have
called for renegotiation of NAFTA's investor-state provisions. 55
The parties themselves also have admitted that this uncertainty
requires their immediate attention. Canada has acknowledged
that the present use of Chapter Eleven is a significant problem
that must be addressed through limitations upon definitions
and access by private industry.556 The United States also
appears willing to consider the removal of public health, safety
and welfare measures from the scope of Article 1110.557 Only
Mexico has expressed reluctance to consider such limitations,
perhaps due to concerns about damaging the country's
improving foreign investment image.558 This reluctance may
552. Id. at 63.
553. See id. at 47.
554. See id.
555. See Robert Collier, Canadian Firm Sues California Over MTBE, S.F.
CHRON., June 18, 1999, at Al; see also Environmentalists Press for Broad Review of
NAFTA Handling of Cases, supra note 34, at 1-2; Latest NAFTA Lawsuit Proves
Threat of Chapter 11 to Health and Environmental Laws, Again, supra note 35, at 1;
Peterson, supra note 33, at Al.
556. See Iritani, supra note 425, at Al.
557. See MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 43, at 48.
558. See id.
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weaken if Mexico is subjected to a growing number of Chapter
Eleven claims. In any event, regardless of the positions of non-
governmental organizations and the parties, it is certain that
"[a]s long as Chapter Eleven... allows companies to directly
sue governments over laws they feel jeopardize their profits, the
numbers of these cases and the severity of their impact will only
increase."559
There are numerous alternatives by which the operation of
Chapter Eleven's investor-state provisions may be limited.
Initially, the parties may wait for the formation of case law
through the accumulation of decisions of arbitration panels.
However, this option is unattractive for several reasons.
Initially, this option assumes that arbitration panels confronted
with claims of private investors will limit the scope of the
investor-state provisions. Such an assumption is a risky
proposition given the broad sweep of Chapter Eleven's language,
as reaffirmed by the Metalclad tribunal, and the uncertainties
inherent in any adversarial proceeding. Second, it has been
aptly noted that the uncertainties created by Chapter Eleven
are inherent in its scope and language. 560 Pending arbitrations
are not likely to significantly reduce these uncertainties given
their endemic nature within the Agreement itself.5
61
Furthermore, panel interpretations and decisions do not
establish precedent, and future panels confronting similar
issues are free to adopt differing interpretations.5 62 The risk of
panels adopting conflicting interpretations is exacerbated by the
confidentiality of final decisions pursuant to the provisions of
the various procedural rules applicable to such arbitrations. 56
As such, interpretations reached by previous panels may not be
available for consideration by future panels.56 Finally, the
process of creation of a body of case law is time-consuming and
may prove costly to the parties if for no other reason than the
cost of defense and payment of claims. The costs associated with
such delays simply cannot be afforded given the burgeoning
number and size of claims asserted by private investors
559. Latest NAFTA Lawsuit Proves Threat of Chapter 11 to Health and
Environmental Laws, Again, supra note 35, at 1.
560. See MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 43, at 20.
561. See id.
562. See NAFTA, supra note 24, art. 1136(1) (providing that "[an award made
by a Tribunal shall have no binding force except between the disputing parties and
in respect of the particular case.").
563. See MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 43, at 20.
564. See id.
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pursuant to Chapter Eleven. 565
Other options to limit the scope of Chapter Eleven would
limit the availability of the dispute resolution processes to
private investors. Specifically, resort to such processes by
private parties could be prohibited where important public
policy issues are at stake.566 Instead of resort to Chapter
Eleven's investor-state provisions, aggrieved parties would be
required to utilize Chapter Twenty's government-to-government
dispute resolution processes. 567 A related option is to require
preliminary government approval of Chapter Eleven challenges
that present public policy issues.5 6 A third option would be to
adapt NAFTA's "gatekeeper" model with respect to taxation
issues to Chapter Eleven challenges.56 9 This option would
require private parties to submit their claims to competent
authorities designated within each party for a determination of
whether the challenged governmental action violates Chapter
Eleven's investor protections.57 0 The private claimant could
proceed pursuant to Chapter Eleven upon receiving a
determination from the designated authorities that the
challenged measure is an unreasonable interference with its
investment or upon the failure of such authorities to reach a
determination within a reasonable time.571 Conversely, resort to
Chapter Eleven would be prohibited if the designated
authorities determine that the measure does not violate Chapter
Eleven. In such an event, the sole course of action for an
aggrieved party would be resort to the government-to-
government dispute resolution processes set forth in Chapter
Twenty.
However, these approaches may prove as unattractive as
awaiting the development of case law. Initially, all of these
565. At the time of preparation of this article, there were twelve pending or
threatened claims of private investors arising from Chapter Eleven's investor-state
provisions, including Metalclad's claim. See MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 43, at
65-70. Canada and Mexico were named as defendants in five claims each, and the
United States was a defendant in two claims. See id. The claims asserted against the
United States totaled $1.7 billion, while the claims asserted against Canada and
Mexico totaled $433 million and $192 million respectively. See id.
566. See id. at 58; see also Lawrence Herman, Settlement of International Trade
.Disputes - Challenges to Sovereignty - A Canadian Prospective, 24 CAN.-U.S. L.J.
121, 135-37 (1998).
567. See NAFTA, supra note 24, arts. 2003-20.
568. See MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 43, at 58.
569. See id.; see also NAFTA, supra note 24, art. 2103(6).
570. See NAFTA, supra note 24, art. 2103(6) & annex 2103.6.
571. See id. art. 2103(6).
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approaches would require amendment of NAFTA itself, which
may prove to be politically unachievable. 572 Additionally, even
assuming that the parties were amenable to amendment, they
would be confronted with the difficult task of ascertaining what
public policy issues should be immunized from Chapter Eleven's
dispute resolution procedures or subject to preliminary review
by the designated "gatekeepers." The standards to be applied by
such "gatekeepers" may also present irreconcilable issues for the
negotiators confronted with the task of revamping Chapter
Eleven. The "gatekeeper" approach also may be criticized for
serving to concentrate excessive authority with respect to
expropriation issues in the hands of a small and immutable
group of designated experts. In addition, any amendment
utilizing the "gatekeeper" approach would have to designate the
amount of time available for review. Time is a crucial issue in
this regard as unreasonable delays may raise due process issues
and cause further injury to claimants, thereby potentially
increasing the amount of damages for which a host state may be
liable. In any event, the amendment process may prove to be
chronologically impracticable given the growing number and
size of the claims asserted pursuant to Chapter Eleven.
Given the inadequacy of the above-noted remedies, perhaps
the most favorable approach for the parties to adopt is the
issuance of an interpretive statement addressing the issues
raised by Chapter Eleven's investor-state provisions.57 3 Such an
interpretive statement would not be an amendment to NAFTA
but rather would serve as a clarification of the parties' intent
with respect to the provisions contained within Chapter Eleven.
Interpretive statements have long been a recognized part of
treaty interpretation. Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties recognizes that interpretive statements
issued by the parties may be utilized in construing disputed
treaty provisions.57 4 The role of interpretive statements in treaty
572. For example, the Canadian government has long sought a narrowing of the
scope of Chapter Eleven, claiming that it was not intended to allow private
companies to overturn domestic policy through the dispute resolution process. See
Iritani, supra note 425, at Al; see also Ian Jack, Mexico First Partner to Lose NAFTA
Case, FIN. POST, available at http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:
205.. .tl_mexico.html (Sept. 1, 2000). However, Mexico has expressed reservations
about any amendment, claiming that the investor-state provisions are working as
intended and fearing that renegotiation of Chapter Eleven will lead to pressure to
renegotiate other portions of the agreement. See Jack, supra.
573. See MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 43, at 47.
574. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679,
692 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). Article 31 (3) specifically provides that:
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construction is recognized in Chapter Eleven of NAFTA, which
provides that "[a]n interpretation by the [Free Trade]
Commission of a provision of this Agreement shall be binding on
a Tribunal established under this Section."575 Thus, unlike the
decisions of arbitral panels, an interpretive statement
construing the scope of Chapter Eleven's investor-state
provisions would be binding upon future panels considering
such issues. 576 Furthermore, an interpretive statement does not
require modification of NAFTA, thereby bypassing the
protracted, and perhaps ultimately fruitless, amendment
process. The issuance of a carefully worded interpretive
statement limited solely to the reach of provisions within
Chapter Eleven also would not impact or imperil any other
chapters or sections of the Agreement.
As noted by Canadian Trade Minister Sergio Marchi, any
interpretive statement issued by NAFTA's Free Trade
Commission should strive for greater openness and the
development of a "common understanding on the investor-state
provisions to ensure that government's ability to legislate and
regulate in the public interest is protected."577 As such, an
interpretive statement should eliminate the uncertainty
confronting regulators with respect to environmental issues as a
result of the potential breadth of Chapter Eleven.578 However,
this need for predictability should not come at the expense of
investors seeking protection from malicious, arbitrary or
discriminatory governmental measures or those deemed to be
expropriation in the classic sense of dispossession. 5 9 These
goals can best be achieved by an interpretive statement that
provides for procedural reform and substantive certainty.
From a procedural standpoint, any interpretive statement
There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties.
Id. art. 31(3).
575. NAFTA, supra note 24, art. 1131(2).
576. See id. art. 1131(2).
577. Sergio Marchi, Address to the NAFTA Fifth Anniversary Luncheon,
reprinted in MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 43, at 10.
578. See MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 43, at 21.
579. See id.
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should provide for greater transparency with respect to the
dispute resolution process. Greater transparency may be
accomplished by two separate means. Initially, the parties
should favor transparency and public access to the dispute
resolution process in every circumstance where such issue is
committed to their discretion. For example, there is no
obligation within NAFTA preventing the publication of notices
of claim. Procedures exist in the United States and Canada for
the public disclosure of such filings, and private claimants are
free to disclose such filings on their own initiative. Furthermore,
there are no secrecy provisions with respect to the consultative
process prior to the actual initiation of arbitration, thereby
permitting the parties to disclose the occurrence, if not the
actual content, of discussions between the investor and the host
state. Furthermore, Article 1126(10) of NAFTA mandates public
disclosure of notices of arbitration actually received by the
parties by requiring delivery of such notices to the Free Trade
Commission's Secretariat for placement in a public register of
documents. 580 Finally, Article 1137(4) and Annex 1137.4 grant
Canada and the United States discretion with respect to the
publication of final awards issued by arbitration panels.58' The
discretion of the parties in all of these instances should be
exercised in favor of disclosure and public access.
However, not all portions of the dispute resolution process
may be opened to the public at the discretion of the parties. For
example, the constitution of the arbitral panels, the treatment of
written submissions and pleadings and the potential for outside
participation are not addressed in NAFTA and are thus left to
the procedures of the applicable arbitral body acting with the
consent of the parties themselves. However, the parties are not
without some authority to influence the arbitral bodies and
disputing investors with respect to public disclosure of such
matters. In these instances, the interpretive statement should
call upon the parties to actively seek public disclosure and
access. In this regard, the presumption in favor of
confidentiality at the behest of the disputing investor should be
580. See NAFTA, supra note 24, art. 1126(10). Article 1126(10) requires a
disputing party to deliver a copy of the notice of arbitration to the Free Trade
Commission's Secretariat within fifteen days of its receipt. See id.
581. See id. art. 1137(4) and annex 1137.4. Annex 1137.4 provides that, where
the United States or Canada is the disputing party, the respective government or a
disputing investor that is a party to the arbitration may make an award public. See
id. When Mexico is the disputing party, Annex 1137.4 provides that the applicable
arbitration rules determine whether the award is subject to publication. See id.
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removed. In its stead, the burden of maintaining confidentiality
and limiting public access should be placed upon the individual
investor seeking such relief.
Providing substantive certainty for environmental
regulators in an interpretive statement is a much less onerous
task than attempting procedural reform. In this regard, the
interpretive statement should seek to restrict the reach of
Chapter Eleven's provisions into environmental regulation. 58 2
The reach of these provisions may be restricted by two separate
means. Initially, non-discriminatory measures based upon a
public purpose consistent with a legitimate objective as defined
in Article 915(1)83 and adopted in accordance with due process
of law should be specifically excluded from challenge pursuant
to Chapter Eleven. 5s4 In the event that an otherwise permissible
environmental measure is alleged to be discriminatory, the
arbitral panel should be permitted to review a number of factors
before concluding that the measure is in violation of Chapter
Eleven. These factors include the location of the investment, the
impact generated by the investment including the ability of the
environment to continue to absorb such impact, the
characteristics of the product sought to regulated and its
environmental implications, changes in environmental
standards, scientific information and regulatory policy and the
necessity of governments to act in a precautionary fashion with
respect to environmental decision-making. 585 Application of
these standards may serve to transform what otherwise appears
to be a discriminatory confiscation of a foreign investment into
582. See MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 43, at 9.
583. Chapter Nine of NAFTA establishes standards with respect to the creation,
maintenance and operation of technical regulations and sanitary measures by the
parties. See NAFTA, supra note 24, arts. 901-15. Article 915(1) defines legitimate
objectives to be served by such regulations and measures. Specifically, a "legitimate
objective" supporting the creation, maintenance or operation of a technical
regulation or sanitary measure is defined as:
(a) safety,
(b) protection of human, animal or plant life or health, the environment or
consumers, including matters relating to quality and identifiability of
goods or services, and
(c) sustainable development,
(d) considering, among other things, where appropriate, fundamental
climatic or other geographical factors, technological or infrastructural
factors, or scientific justification but does not include the protection of
domestic production.
Id. art. 915(1).
584. See MANN & VON MOLTmE, supra note 43, at 73.
585. See id. at 72.
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one justified on environmental, scientific and public policy
bases.
Regardless of the option selected by the parties, it is clear
that taking no action whatsoever is simply unacceptable. The
governments of the respective parties owe an obligation to their
component state and local governments and, ultimately, to their
constituencies, to clarify their intent with respect to the
application of NAFTA's investor-state provisions to
environmental measures. This obligation is especially urgent if
the interpretation urged upon the member states by the
Metalclad tribunal was unanticipated or unintended when the
parties entered into the free trade agreement eight years ago.
Nevertheless, until such time as reform, interpretation or
amendment occurs, whether unknown, overlooked or
unanticipated, NAFTA is part of the parties' respective legal
systems, and the right of investors such as Metalclad to bring
claims is clearly found within its provisions.

